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ABSTRACT 
 
The pressures for reform within the World Trade Organization have led to the European Union 
(EU) reforming its sugar policy with a price cut phased from 2006 and scheduled to end in 2009. 
The reform will have an impact on the sugar protocol African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries that have a preferential market access to the European Union with a protected price. 
This study investigates the effect of EU sugar policy reform has on these ACP sugar countries.  
First, it examines how the protocol countries’ sugar supply and demand determinants. 
While the determinants of supply in some countries performed as expected, others did not show 
sign of an improvement due to the sugar protocol. On the demand side we found that in some 
countries price does not affect the decision of the consumer.  
Second it explores the protocol countries transfer benefits before and after the reform. 
Before the reform, the countries were enjoying substantial transfer benefits. After the reform, 
there are some countries that will no longer be able to make profits by selling to the European 
Union.  
Finally, we develop a quota market analysis to examine negotiated transfer quota 
outcomes between ACP countries. We allow for the countries that can no longer make a profit to 
sell their quota rights to the countries that can still make a profit. We assumed equal bargaining 
powers and unequal bargaining powers. In the equal bargaining power case, total profit is equally 
divided between seller and buyer. In the unequal bargaining power case, we consider two 
scenarios. The first scenario where the world sugar price is not affected by EU sugar policy 
reform revealed that the sellers would have greater bargaining power and a larger share of the 
profit. The second scenario where the world sugar price is increased by thirty percent revealed 
that the buyer would exercise superior bargaining power relative to the seller and would have a 
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larger share of the profit. Buyers can expand their production and sellers can use the revenues to 
diversify away from sugar. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 General Background 
The world sugar market is one of the most heavily protected markets with most producers 
benefiting from a variety of programs, such as production quotas, supply controls, market 
sharing, sales quotas, import quotas, imports tariffs, exports subsidies. The European Union is 
both one of the world’s largest exporters and importers of sugar; but it is also one of the world’s 
most heavily protected markets. The EU sugar industry has existed for many years as has the 
tradition of protection for that industry. Despite changes that have occurred in many EU 
agricultural sectors due to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reforms, the sugar sector has 
hardly been touched since its inception in 1968. 
Although the European Union remains one of the world’s leading sugar producers, it is 
also a major importer of sugar. Nearly all EU sugar imports occur under special preferential 
arrangements (Sergey, Lindsay and Donald).  This includes the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) sugar group which supplies the largest volume of sugar to the European Union. There are 
19 former European colonies (Barbados, Belize, Congo, Fiji, Guyana, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, 
Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Suriname, Swaziland, Trinidad 
and Tobago, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) that produce sugar and receive 
preferential access to EU markets. Under the sugar protocol these countries are able to export 
approximately 1.3 MMT of sugar per year to the European Union at a guaranteed minimum price 
that is substantially above the world sugar price. This acts to transfer resources from the 
European Union to ACP countries. The European Union essentially applies its internal sugar 
policy, consisting of production quotas and guaranteed prices, to the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) sugar group (Herrmann and Weiss 1995).  
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After being criticized for many years, EU sugar policy faced a ruling in 2004, handed 
down by the World Trade Organization (WTO), claiming that the European Union’s support 
policy allows European countries to illegally export sugar. The ruling was the result of an 
investigation motivated by complaints from Brazil, Thailand and Australia, three major sugar 
producers, who claimed that EU sugar policy was highly trade distorting and would have to be 
reevaluated if freer trade were to be achieved. In order to comply with the requirement of the 
WTO panel and to make the EU sugar sector more compatible with the rest of the world, the EU 
Council reformed its’ sugar sector in 2005. This reform involved a progressive reduction in 
export subsidies and a large cut in the intervention price starting in 2006. The implications of an 
EU sugar regime adjustment have been projected to be a reduction in the quantity of sugar 
exported and a fall in the European domestic price of sugar by 36% over a four-year period (20% 
cut in 2006, 25% in 2007, 30% in 2008 and a 36% cut in 2009). 
Reforming EU sugar policy will mean that ACP suppliers will receive the same price cut 
on exports to the European Union as do EU sugar growers. It is projected, as a result, that ACP 
suppliers will experience revenue losses. 
1.2 ACP Sugar Protocol 
The European Union occupies an important place in the world sugar market as both a major 
exporter (in 2002 the EU was the third largest sugar manufacturer after Brazil and India) and 
importer. Although tariffs on many agricultural imports are high, the European Union grants 
preferences to developing countries under a variety of schemes. Currently all EU sugar imports 
come under special preferential arrangements. These preferential trade arrangements, which are 
primarily for developing countries, are a key feature of the EU import regime and represent a 
crucial aspect of the economies of the beneficiaries (Sergey, Lindsay and Donald). Furthermore, 
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there exist historic ties between certain EU Member States and their former colonies. Since 1975, 
these arrangements have been incorporated into the Sugar Protocol, agreed between certain 
developing countries and the EU alongside the wider EU-ACP Partnership Agreement.  
The EU sugar regime allows for duty free or for reduced duty imports of both raw and 
white sugar from these countries (Sergey, Lindsay and Donald). The EU-ACP cooperation can 
be traced back to the Treaty of Rome that was signed in 1957 and guaranteed to contribute to the 
growth of the countries with historical connections with EU member states.  As part of the UK’s 
accession arrangements, a preferential sugar import program was agreed to with the traditional 
developing country suppliers. The ACP protocol effectively translated a United Kingdom 
commitment to the commonwealth into an EU (at the time EEC) commitment to the ACP. The 
preferential access was reduced from about 2 million tons imported by the UK refineries under 
the old agreement to 1.3 million tons of raw sugar (Sergey, Lindsay and Donald). The sugar 
protocol was embodied in the Lomé Convention of 1975. The sugar protocol and a parallel 
agreement with India allow for the import of 1.3 million tons of raw sugar, white value a year. 
This tonnage is not subject to import duties and is purchased at the level of the EU support price 
for raw sugar. In 2000 the Cotonou agreement replaced the Lomé Convention, but sugar 
arrangements remained practically unchanged (Sergey, Lindsay and Donald).  
1.3 Problem Statement 
 
The African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and the European Union have 
mutually benefited from a long and profitable partnership in the sugar sector under the terms of 
the ACP/EU Sugar Protocol. This agreement, which came into force in 1975, guarantees access 
to the EU market for fixed quantities of ACP sugar at preferential prices over an indefinite period 
of time. It is a legally binding, intergovernmental agreement between ACP signatory States and 
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the European Union with obligations to be met by all contracting parties. The Sugar Protocol is 
acknowledged by the recipients as a model for cooperation development because, according to 
involved parties, it has brought significant benefits to the economies of small and vulnerable 
countries (African Caribbean and Pacific Sugar Group). 
Given the WTO ruling and the European Union’s intent to reduce both domestic 
production and exports in order to fulfill its commitments, the guaranteed price that the ACP 
sugar group will receive will be reduced by 36% as of 2009. In addition to the direct impact on 
EU sugar farmers and producers, the reform will affect all countries presently benefiting from 
preferential access, such as the sugar protocol countries. Though the total sugar protocol quota 
will remain constant at 1.3 million tons, the price cut applies to their exports to the European 
Union too and will be reflected in reduced export revenues.  
Many ACP countries do not have a resilient socio-economic infrastructure capable of 
absorbing the consequences resulting from such price reductions as do EU member states. The 
reliance upon sugar in these countries is markedly different from that of producers within the 
European Union. ACP sugar industries typically comprise a large percentage of Gross Domestic 
Product while both the employment and social benefits provided by the industries are central to 
the social cohesion of ACP communities. The dominance of the sugar industry has meant that it 
is the focal point around which many social services and infrastructure developments have 
evolved. The most serious impact of the reform may be the loss of health and educational 
services funded in part by the sugar industry. In summary, there is a serious risk of economic 
devastation and irreparable damage to the ACP and other less developed sugar countries if the 
European Union reforms of the sugar sector are implemented. it is important to identify a 
response to the reform that will limit losses. This analysis looks at how best to ensure the future 
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well being of ACP sugar suppliers in the new environment arising from EU sugar policy reform. 
1.4 Justification 
The lack of extensive country specific research on the impact of EU sugar policy reform on ACP 
has served to stimulate this study. It is important to know the outcome effect on these countries 
and recommend a judicious solution to deal with the situation, since all are less developed 
economies. Because the sugar industry is a vital source of jobs and government revenue in most 
ACP countries, it is important to identify strategies that will further protect the development of 
their economies and families. The success of these industries is influenced by the trade 
agreements between the European Union and the ACP countries that have been ongoing since 
1975. With EU sugar policy reform, ACP economies will be affected, thus the need to formulate 
optimal strategies that are not only be consistent with the ruling of the WTO but will also 
preserve the best interest of the ACP economies is of paramount interest.  
This study investigates the effect of the EU sugar policy reform on the ACP sugar group. 
This is of special relevance, since ACP countries and the European Union have a special trade 
preference in the form of the sugar protocol. On the other hand, a reform of EU sugar policy will 
reduce the ACP preferential price and hence, affect revenue transfers that ACP countries were 
getting. The work is meaningful in that it will identify a possible response to the EU sugar policy 
reform for ACP countries. Moreover, it will identify the strategy that optimally distributes the 
benefits of the ACP countries through the utilization of their profit functions. 
Despite the fact that the impact of EU sugar policy reform has been a principal concern as 
of late, not all relevant aspects of the topic have been considered. For instance, the redistribution 
of quota rights amongst ACP countries has not been studied in detail. Many of the studies have 
focused on the assessment of revenue losses and identifying potential winners and losers from 
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the new policy.  This paper contributes to the limited literature by extending the work on the 
implications to explore the effect of a market for the sugar import quota among the ACP 
countries. A quota market in the ACP sugar producing group would have the advantage of 
restructuring the quota distribution from being relatively arbitrary to a greater concentration in 
low cost ACP countries. This would lead to sugar preferences being redirected to more 
competitive countries. Moreover, high cost producing countries can use the revenues from quota 
sales to invest in research and production of other enterprises which can lead to those countries 
becoming more competitive in other activities. 
1.5 Objectives 
 
The main objective of this study is to investigate the impact of EU sugar policy reform on 
revenue transfers to ACP sugar producing countries and to suggest a mechanism for dealing with 
the situation. The specific objectives are as follows: 
1.) To estimate the determinants of the sugar industries in all ACP countries. The structure of 
each country’s model includes behavioral equations for area harvested, yield, and production for 
sugar cane on the supply side, and per capita consumption and ending stocks on the demand side. 
2.) To determine and measure production and transportation costs of sugar for each ACP 
country. This will be used to evaluate the transfer of profits before the reform and the projected 
revenue transfer after the entire price cut comes into effect. We will then explore how protocol 
countries are going to be affected by the reform and determine which countries will likely 
discontinue their sugar exports to the EU. 
3.) To construct a quota market model based on bilateral monopoly theory where countries 
whose sugar industry cannot survive the EU sugar policy reform sell their quota rights to 
countries that are more efficient. We apply the model to determine quota allocation, bargaining 
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powers and the price each country will pay. Using the outcome of the bilateral monopoly model, 
we will then calculate the profit yielded by each country and contrast it with the reform case in 
order to show the improvement that the mechanism is going to generate. 
1.6 Literature Review 
A rich body of literature regarding the ACP-EU sugar protocol has emerged in recent 
years. All of the studies recognize that the sugar protocol has provided some economic benefits 
to the ACP countries. Herrmann and Weiss (1995) provided an economic evaluation of the sugar 
protocol by elaborating on the impacts on prices, trade, export earnings and economic welfare. 
Using the Newbery and Stiglitz approach, Hermann and Weiss jointly evaluate the sugar 
protocol’s impact on the level and instability of sugar export earnings and computed transfer and 
risk benefits.  Their major conclusion is that the policy has to be evaluated differently from the 
donor’s and the recipient’s respective points of view. Focusing on the recipient country’s point 
of view, they found that there is a revenue raising or stabilizing effect created by the sugar 
protocol. In addition they pointed out that the instability of sugar export earnings was lowered in 
all but one ACP country. Their third finding was that, in addition to the transfer benefits that 
ACP countries were receiving, there was a significant portion of the welfare gains that were 
realized could be attributed to risk benefits.  
McDonald (1996) extended the work on the EU sugar policy to explore the implications 
of a reform for African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. He showed that there are significant 
reductions in income transfers and that the Caribbean countries plus Fiji and Mauritius bear the 
heaviest loss. In a similar manner, Milner, Morgan and Zgovu (2004) explored the way in which 
a reform will affect the transfers of welfare to the ACP countries. The authors take into account 
the fact that OECD sugar reform can affect both domestic and world prices. They concluded that 
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while some countries would lose due to decreased transfers, others may gain due to the impact 
that sugar reform has on world prices. They argue that the differences are due to the uneven 
allocation of preferential quotas across protocol countries and the highly differential dependence 
of the countries on EU and non-EU export markets. 
The practice of quota leasing has been studied for various commodities.  Bureau, 
Guyomard, Morin and Requillard (1997) develop an analytical framework for evaluating the 
consequences of a market for quota rights in the EU sugar sector. The theoretical framework they 
use is based on duality theory and employs the concept of the virtual or shadow price of a 
rationed good. They show that the equilibrium of the market for a quota is a function of the level 
of the world price of sugar and that different cases have to be distinguished when analyzing the 
comparative statics of such a market. They use a simulation to show that marketable quota rights 
would benefit farmers. Butcher and Heady studied probable quota exchange within a small Iowa 
area and found that there are some possibilities for income gains (cost savings) by redistributing 
quotas. They argue that permitting quotas to be traded in a “quota market” would appear to be an 
expeditious way for allocating quotas so that the efficiency of production will be greater than 
with ordinary mandatory controls. Babcock and Foster (1992) explain the distribution of 
economic rents between owners of quota rights and renters under mandatory supply controls and 
examine how this distribution changes with increases in marginal costs.  
There are several variants of the bilateral monopoly model based on a variety of 
assumptions regarding both institutional setting and bargaining procedure (Truett and Truett). An 
extensive discussion of bilateral monopoly can be found in the works of. Bowley (1928), Fellner 
(1947), and Machlup and Taber (1960). These authors describe a solution based on joint profit 
maximization that would lead to a determinate quantity traded of the intermediate product but 
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not a determinate intermediate product price. Recently, Blair, Kaserman, and Romano (1989) 
have reiterated the joint profit maximizing solution. Like earlier writers, they argue that the 
quantity traded of the intermediate good will be determinate, while its price will be 
indeterminate. Truett and Truett (1993) use a contract curve approach to establish that the 
equilibrium price of the intermediate product is determined through a bargaining process 
between the seller and the buyer and that the optimal solution calls for a joint profit 
maximization by both the seller and the buyer. Devadoss and Cooper (2000) use an optimal 
control, dynamic optimization model to simultaneously determine the price and quantity of the 
intermediate product in a joint profit maximizing bilateral monopoly with equal bargaining 
power. Dasgupta and Devadoss (2002) also applied a game theoretic model to derive the 
equilibrium price and quantity of the intermediate product when buyer and seller have unequal 
bargaining power. Their game theoretic model specifies multi-period contracts with threats and 
punishments that induce Nash equilibrium for a jointly negotiated price and quantity. 
1.7 Dissertation Outline 
This dissertation will be organized into five chapters. Chapter 1 has presented the 
background, research problem statement, justification of the research, objectives of the study and 
a review of the literature. Chapter 2 will examine the ACP sugar economies. The theoretical 
framework for the econometric estimation, the transfer benefits determination, and the bilateral 
monopoly approach will be discussed in Chapter 3. The empirical approach will be conducted to 
determine bargaining power, prices and quantities traded between the countries, and the results 
will be discussed in Chapter 4. The summary, conclusions, and suggestions for further research 
will be included in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 2. STRUCTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ACP COUNTRIES’ SUGAR 
ECONOMIES 
 
2.1. EU Sugar Policy 
 
The European Union’s sugar policy uses production quotas, import controls, and export refunds 
(subsidies) to support producer prices at levels which are well above international prices. The 
program is financed primarily by EU consumers who pay higher prices than world market prices. 
The sugar policy began in 1965, as part of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) which dates 
to 1958. Two institutional support prices, “the intervention price” (a floor price) and the 
“threshold price” (a minimum import price) form a band within which the domestic EU market 
price moves. The threshold price is meant to ensure that domestic market prices can rise toward a 
target price without being undercut by third-country imports. If prices fall below this intervention 
price, then the European Union buys the commodity and stores it until the Commission decides 
to sell it domestically or export it. These prices vary by country to allow for transportation costs 
between surplus and deficit areas. Intervention sugar prices have been constant in nominal terms 
since 1984/85 and have been more than double world market prices during most of the past 20 
years. Some countries (e.g., Italy, Portugal, and Spain) have also been allowed to pay national 
aid to sugar producers which has, in turn, encouraged further production (F.O. Licht, p.518). 
Import duties are used to prevent lower priced imports from the world market, and export 
refunds are paid to exporters so as to cover the gap between the EU price and the generally lower 
world market prices when commodities are sold from intervention stocks. The basic market 
support system for sugar remains virtually unchanged in the current day as it was initially 
designed in 1968, despite reforms to the CAP. 
2.2. EU Sugar Consumption, Production and Trade 
Sugar production, consumption, and trade in the European Union have been highly influenced by 
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government programs through the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Sugar is produced from 
either sugar cane (2 percent) or beets (98 percent) in almost all of the EU’s 25 member states, 
(with the exception of Luxembourg, Estonia, Cyprus, and Malta). Major sugar producing states 
are France and Germany, with about 50 percent of total production, followed by Poland, Italy, 
and the United Kingdom (European Commission, 2004 (b)). Both production and domestic use 
have significantly increased over time (ERS-USDA, PS&D Tables). Total sugar production and 
consumption in 1961 was 5,474,000 and 6,312,000 MT, respectively; in 2004, production and 
consumption totaled 14,358,000 and 17,132,000 MT, respectively. Despite this significant 
change from 1960 levels, production has remained relatively stable since 1992 and domestic 
consumption has been nearly constant since the beginning of the 1990s (Figure 2.1). From 1961 
to 1981, total exports of refined sugar increased (Figure 2.2). From 1961 to 2004, total exports 
grew from 1,040,000 to 7,130,000 MT. Exports have exceeded imports since 1977. Imports 
increased substantially from 1961 to 1974; since 1978, they have been relatively stable and 
significantly below the volume of sugar exports (Figure 2.2). Total imports, mostly in raw sugar, 
were 1,900,000 MT in 2004. In general, the EU is a net exporter; however, because of the 
difference between the high price paid for imports relative to the low price received for exports, 
a negative trade balance in terms of value has existed since 2002 (European Commission, 2004 
(b)). 
2.3. Source of Reform 
The European Union was pressured by external sources to reform its sugar regime. These 
pressures were associated with how other trading countries on the world sugar market are 
affected by the trade distorting effects of EU sugar policy. The major external agent for reform 
of sugar policies lies in multilateral trade negotiations conducted under the auspices of the WTO.
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Figure2.1.: EU sugar total production and total consumption 1960-2006  
Source: USDA PS&D data 
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Figure 2.2.: EU total sugar imports and exports 1960-2006 
Source: USDA PS&D data 
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In September 2002, Australia and Brazil filed complaints and requests for consultations with the 
European Union through the World Trade Organization, concerning the nature of the EU’s sugar 
market. The complaint was that the volume of EU subsidized exports of sugar exceeded the 
levels the European Union had committed itself to under the World Trade Organization and that 
this was causing harm by reducing world prices. In 2004, the World Trade Organization, after an 
investigation, acknowledged the claims made by the three countries and urged the European 
Union to reform its sugar policy. As expected, therefore, that same year the European 
Commission considered plans for a radical reform of the sugar regime. It proposed to cut back 
sugar exports and export refunds substantially, reduce intervention, reduce EU production and 
the internal sugar price, and grant de-coupled payments to sugar beet farmers. These reforms 
were to be phased in from 2006 over a period of four years.  
The reform is expected to enhance the competitiveness and market-orientation of the EU 
sugar sector, guarantee it a viable long-term future and strengthen the EU’s negotiating position 
in the current round of world trade talks. In addition, it will bring a system, which has remained 
largely unchanged for almost 40 years, into line with the rest of the reformed Common 
Agricultural Policy. The guaranteed price for white sugar will be cut by 36 percent over four 
years. Other details of the reform are that farmers will be compensated for, on average, 64.2 
percent of the price cut through a decoupled payment; countries which give up more than half of 
their production quota will be entitled to pay an additional coupled payment of 30 percent of the 
income loss for a temporary period of five years; a generous voluntary restructuring scheme will 
be established to provide incentives for less competitive producers to leave the sector; and 
intervention buying of surplus production will be phased out after four years (EUROPA press 
release, February 2006). 
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Within these proposals, the commission takes it as granted that the provisions of the ACP 
sugar protocol continue to commit the European Union to buying the annually agreed quantity of 
sugar from protocol countries. However, the commission also recognizes that the proposed 
reforms mean that the commitment would have to be fulfilled at a lower guaranteed price (i.e., 
the new lower EU intervention price.) 
2.4. ACP Sugar Protocol Quota Allocation 
Currently, 18 ACP countries plus India participate in the sugar protocol. The core of the 
agreement is the European Union’s obligation to import specific quantities of sugar from these 
countries’ at guaranteed prices derived from the internal EU price and are supposed to equal the 
price range obtained in the European Union. The protocol also obliges ACP countries to deliver 
the agreed quantity; failure to deliver for reasons other than “force majeure” leads to a quota loss 
of the same amount. Sugar represents a high proportion of total agricultural products and is the 
primary agricultural export of these ACP countries. The European Union is a major outlet for 
ACP sugar. Quota allocations have remained nearly constant since 1975 for most countries 
except for Zimbabwe and Ivory Coast which joined the protocol in early 1980. 
Table 2.1 and the Charts below present the distribution of the quota and their share of 
production and export quantities before the price cut came into effect. The sugar protocol is a 
way by which the European Union provides transfer assistance to its old colonies. 
Sugar protocol countries are a rather heterogeneous group with diverging production 
levels and different degrees of dependency on the EU market. Figure 2.3 shows that there are 
five countries that receive the majority of the quota. Mauritius receives by far the largest delivery 
rights with nearly forty per cent of total quota, followed by Fiji, Guyana, Jamaica and Swaziland. 
Together, these five countries capture almost eighty per cent of the total quota, whereas
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             Table 2.1. : ACP Sugar Protocol quota distribution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            Source: ACP Sugar Website, FAS PS&D data and own computation 
 
 
Countries Quota Production 05 Exports 05 Share of total quota Share of 05 production Share of 04 exports  
Barbados 50312.00 40000 35872 3.8 125.8 140.3 
Belize 40349.00 105000 95007 3.0 38.4 42.5 
Congo 10186.00 75000 51624 0.8 13.6 19.7 
Ivory Coast 10186.00 140000 28924 0.8 7.3 35.2 
Fiji 165348.00 330000 303039 12.4 50.1 54.6 
Guyana 159410.00 270000 209043 12.0 59.0 76.3 
Jamaica 118696.00 184000 118905 8.9 64.5 99.8 
Kenya 10000.00 489000 21760 0.8 2.0 46.0 
Madagascar 10760.00 26000 8852 0.8 41.4 121.6 
Malawi 20824.00 260000 104166 1.6 8.0 20.0 
Mauritius 491031.00 600000 539457 36.9 81.8 91.0 
St. Kitts  15591.00 15000 11478 1.2 103.9 135.8 
Swaziland 117845.00 598000 538887 8.8 19.7 21.9 
Tanzania 10186.00 255000 20149 0.8 4.0 50.6 
Trinidad  43751.00 35000 35201 3.3 125.0 124.3 
Zambia 26987 250000 153487 2.0 10.8 17.6 
Zimbabwe 30225 525000 149458 2.3 5.8 20.2 
Total 1331687.00      
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Figure 2.3.: ACP sugar quota share of total quota 2005 
Source: ACP Sugar Web Site
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the remaining ten ACP countries receive less than five per cent of the quota. 
Figure 2.4 shows that countries such as Barbados, Trinidad, and St. Kitts, saw their 2005 
production fall short of the quota that they were allocated (their sugar quota amount was more 
than 2005’s total production ). Other countries for which their quota accounts for a major 
proportion of their sugar production are Mauritius (81.9%), Jamaica (64.5%), Guyana (59%), Fiji 
(50.1%), Madagascar (41.4%), and Belize (38.4%). These proportions suggest that these 
countries will have a high dependency on the sugar protocol. The other countries will be less 
dependent on the sugar protocol.  
Information on the quota share of 2005 exports for each country is also provided in 
Figure 2.5 above. Linking the two figures, the dependency of the countries on the Sugar Protocol 
can be seen. Countries like Mauritius and Jamaica, for example, export almost all their sugar to 
the European Union, since EU prices are above world market prices and their quotas are 
relatively high. Other sugar protocol countries, such as Swaziland, Zambia, or Zimbabwe, which 
are important sugar producers as well, have much lower quotas and thus a lower dependency on 
EU markets. Nevertheless, the sugar protocol offers most ACP countries an interesting marketing 
alternative with favorable conditions that plays a substantial role in their economies. Some ACP 
countries such as Congo, Cote d’Ivoire and Tanzania produce more than their quota but their 
exports show that they did not fulfill their quota quantity for that year. There is an uneven 
allocation of the preferential quotas across protocol countries. That is reflected in the fact that the 
distribution is not proportional to the production capacity of each country. However it can be 
seen that, for the most part, the quota accounts for a significant share of the exports for these 
countries. This supports the statement that the sugar protocol is a large source of revenue for 
these countries. 
19 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4.: ACP sugar quota share of 2005 production 
Source: ACP Sugar Web Site and USDA/FAS PS&D Data
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Figure 2.5.: ACP sugar quota share of 2005 sugar exports 
Source: ACP Sugar Web Site and USDA/FAS PS&D Data  
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2.5. ACP Sugar Industry Cost Structure 
Cost estimates are important in understanding the dynamics of sugar markets and for assessing 
the competitiveness of sugar producing countries. In our analysis, we use these estimates as 
benchmarks to gain insight into the vulnerability and resilience of the sugar producing countries 
at alternative price levels. In analyzing cost, we considered both transportation and production 
cost. It was difficult to construct a complete data set on transportation and production cost for the 
ACP countries. Estimation was not possible because a time series data set of the variables that 
needed to be used was not available. As a result, we had to settle for data based on these 
computations. Two sources were used in computing the cost data set. For production costs, we 
used the USDA attaché reports and for transportation costs we used a data set that LMC 
International was willing to share. LMC International is a British consultancy that is 
internationally recognized for its expertise on sugar. It works on cost of production issues and 
regularly updates variable costs for a wide variety of producers worldwide; however most of the 
figures are not published. What we did was to use the available data and the determinants of each 
variable to use as proxies for specific countries for which we could not obtain the data. 
2.5.1. Transportation Costs 
2.5.1.1. Freight Rates 
Freight is represented by the average cost of sea freight to EU ports in the first half of 2007. Out 
of the seventeen countries, data was obtained for ten. LMC reports that all southern African 
countries ship from either the ports of Maputo or Beira in Mozambique and therefore have the 
same or similar rates. Following this rationale, freight rates are derived for the remaining seven 
countries based on the assumption that countries from the same region are shipping from the 
same port, and hence, all have the same rates. Table 2.4 shows the detailed computation. 
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2.5.1.2. Fobbing Costs 
‘Fobbing’ refers to the cost of taking raw sugar from the mill to a free on board (f.o.b) basis (i.e. 
loaded on a vessel in the port of origin). Here, again, we were given the fobbing rates for the 
same ten countries as with the freight rates. Using those rates in association with the factors that 
explain differences in transport costs we were able to derive the fobbing rates for the remaining 
seven countries. The first and most studied determinant that we considered is distance (Table 
2.2). Many studies have explored the relationship between geographical distance and transport 
costs and most conclude that there is a positive link between the two variables. The greater the 
distance between two locations, the higher the expected transport cost. The second factor 
considered is country characteristics, which relates to geographical and infrastructure measures 
(Table 2.3). For geographical measures, we consider whether the country of origin is landlocked 
or whether it is an island. In the case of the infrastructure measure, we look at the density of the 
road network, the paved road network, and the number of per capita telephone main lines in 
order to measure the cost of travel in and through a country. The next factor that we consider is 
whether the countries involved share a common border. Following Limão and Venables, we 
consider that neighboring countries have more integrated transport networks that should reduce 
the number of transshipments (from rail to road or across different types of rail gauge). Also, 
neighboring countries are more likely to have transit and customs agreements that reduce transit 
times and translate into lower shipping and insurance costs. Finally, the higher volume of trade 
between neighbor countries should dramatically increase the possibilities for backhauling 
allowing for the sharing of fixed costs over two trips. Details of the fobbing data are presented in 
Table 2.4. 
2.5.2. Production Costs 
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Production costs were derived using the USDA/ERS sugar and sweetener situation outlook 
reports and data from the World Bank (International Development Magazine (IDM)). Both 
sources used the estimates published by LMC International but did not report detailed results for 
specific countries. According to the USDA ERS report, LMC considers three different stages in 
the estimation of the sugar cane cost of production. The first comprises field costs. It covers land 
preparation before planting to the delivery of cane to the processing mill. Estimates are made for 
labor, capital, and all fuel, chemicals, and fertilizers used in the field. The second stage is the 
factory costs. For sugarcane, this covers all costs from the initial arrival to the delivery of raw 
sugar into bulk storage at the mill. In addition, all byproduct credits are applied against factory 
costs. As with field costs, estimates are divided into their respective labor, capital, fuel and 
chemical components. The third stage represents administrative and overhead costs that cannot 
be adequately included solely as a field or factory expense. The results that the USDA reported 
show the average cost of producing raw cane sugar for the groups of countries. In the September 
2001 sugar and sweetener situation and outlook (USDA, ERS), it was reported that Zambia and 
Zimbabwe are among the lowest cost sugar producers with an average cost of just 7.81 cents per 
pound (172.18$/Ton) for the years 1994-1999 . Another report from the same source shows that 
Belize and Guyana are in the medium to high cost group with an average of 16.54 cents per 
pound (364.64$/Ton). The same report puts Barbados, Jamaica, St Kitts and Nevis and Trinidad 
and Tobago in the high cost group with an average of 23.56 cents per pound (519.41$/Ton).  
Using pertinent information obtained from the World Bank, we were able to determine a 
grouping of the countries based on their average raw sugar production costs.  
Low cost producers: Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia, Swaziland  
Medium to High cost producers: Fiji, Guyana, Mauritius, Belize, Congo, and Tanzania 
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High cost producers: Ivory Coast, St. Kitts and Nevis, Barbados, Jamaica, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Trinidad and Tobago.  
 A detailed computation is shown in Table 2.4 and Figure 2.6 below. 
2.5.3. Summary 
 
The production cost of sugar in the ACP countries ranged from 673 $/T to 263 $/T in 2005. 
These costs are low to slightly high when compared to many other sugar producing countries in 
the world. Countries like Trinidad and Tobago, Madagascar, Kenya, Jamaica, Barbados, St. Kitts 
and Nevis, Ivory Coast, were already struggling to produce sugar at a competitive price. 
These production costs are very important because they will be used to assess the profitability of 
the sugar production in each country. For simplicity, we assume that these values will be the 
same when the final price cut is implemented. The break-even, before and after the reform, were 
also reported in Table 2.2. Based on these results, we can see that, before the reform, all ACP 
countries could profitably export to the European Union. Although some countries are not as 
profitable as others (the break-even for Trinidad is 7.1$/T while Zimbabwe is making a profit of 
417$/T), it is clear that the sugar protocol played a significant role in the economies of the ACP 
countries. After the final price cut, the EU price will be reduced by 36%. The computation of the 
resulting break-even prices is summarized in Table 2.2. Estimates show some concerning results 
as all ACP countries will suffer a loss. Moreover, out of the seventeen countries, only seven are 
able to obtain a positive profit with their transfer expected to decrease substantially. The heaviest 
losses will occur in those ACP countries that had a large share of the quota but were high cost 
producers (i.e., those that were more dependent on the Sugar Protocol). 
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Table 2.2. Geographical distance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source LSU AgCenter GIS Lab 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country Capital Distance (mile)  
Congo Brazzaville 1813.31 
Mozambique Maputo 0 
Madagascar Antananarivo 1068.55 
Uganda Kampala 1731.85 
Kenya Nairobi 1659.03 
Trinidad Port of Spain 379.96 
Guyana Georgetown 0 
Barbados Bridgetown 479.54 
St. Kitts an Basseterre 831.83 
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Table 2.3. ACP countries Geographical and infrastructures measures 
Country Geographical Paved (Km)  unpaved (Km) Total/ rank (Km) Main line/rank 
Barbados Island 1,600  1600 (177) 134900 (133) 
Belize Port 575 2,432 3007 (167) 33900 (176) 
Congo Landlocked 2,794 150,703 153497 (34) 9700 (205) 
Fiji Island 1,692 1,748 3440 (164) 108400 (139) 
Guyana Port 590 7,380 7970 (142) 110100 (138) 
Ivory Coast Port 6,500 73,500 80000 (60) 730000 (89) 
Jamaica Island 15,937 5,615 21552 (109) 342000 (113) 
Kenya Port 8,933 54,332 63265 (74) 264800 (119) 
Madagascar Island 7,617 58,046 65663 (70) 133900 (134) 
Malawi Landlocked 6,956 8,495 15451 (123) 175200 (127) 
Mauritius Island 2,028  2028 (173) 357300 (106) 
St. Kitts & Nevis Island 163 220 383 (198) 25000 (182) 
Swaziland Port 1,078 2,516 3594 (161) 44000 (165) 
Tanzania Port 6,808 72,083 78891 (61) 165013 (128) 
Trinidad & Tobago Island 4,252 4,068 8320 (140) 323800 (115) 
Zambia Landlocked 20,117 71,323 91440 (55) 91800 (146) 
Zimbabwe Landlocked 18,481 78,786 97267 (46) 344,500  (112 
Source : CIA Factbook  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
 
 
Table 2. 4. ACP Production cost and Break even prices before and after reform 
 
Country Prod Cost 
$/Ton 
Fobbing 
$/Ton 
Freight  
$/Ton 
Total costs 
$/Ton 
EUP 05 
$/Ton 
EUP 09 
$/Ton 
PreR-BE 
$/Ton 
PostR-BE 
$/Ton 
Barbados 520 15 61 596 680.13 435.32 84.13 -160.7 
Belize 330 36 61 427 680.13 435.32 252.9 8.1 
Congo 345 64 65 474 680.13 435.32 206.1 -38.7 
Fiji 300 8.5 67 375 680.13 435.32 305.1 60.3 
Guyana 310 6 61 377 680.13 435.32 303.5 58.7 
Ivory Cost 450 10 65 525 680.13 435.32 155.1 -89.7 
Jamaica 550 23 61 634 680.13 435.32 46.4 -198.4 
Kenya 500 70 65 635 680.13 435.32 45.1 -199.7 
Madagascar 575 30 65 670 680.13 435.32 10.1 -234.7 
Malawi 215 64 65 344 680.13 435.32 335.9 91.1 
Mauritius 335 17 57 409 680.13 435.32 270.8 26.0 
St. K&N 475 20 61 556 680.13 435.32 124.1 -120.7 
Swaziland 275 30 65 370 680.13 435.32 310.1 65.3 
Tanzania 335 30 65 430 680.13 435.32 250.1 5.3 
Trinidad 600 12 61 673 680.13 435.32 7.1 -237.7 
Zambia 245 92 65 402 680.13 435.32 278.1 33.3 
Zimbabwe 154 44 65 263 680.13 435.32 417.0 172.2 
Source: LMC, World Bank and own computation 
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Figure 2.6.: ACP production cost and EU Pre and post-reform prices  
 
Source: LMC, World Bank
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CHAPTER 3.THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. Theoretical Framework 
 
3.1.1. Supply and Demand Specification 
Supply and demand are based on consumer and producer behavior and describe market relations 
between prospective sellers and buyers of a good. These relationships are the fundamental basis 
of microeconomic analysis and are used as the underlying foundation for numerous economic 
models and theories. For example, in a competitive market the equilibrium will be reached when 
the quantity demanded by consumers is equal to the quantity supplied by producers. The theory 
of supply and demand is critical in that it allows economists to understand the market economy 
by explaining the mechanism by which resource allocation decisions are made. An important 
concept in understanding supply and demand is that of elasticity. The elasticity is a measure of 
the relative change in supply or demand in response to a relative change of certain variables. 
3.1.1.1. Consumer Theory 
Economic theory presents demand as the relationship between the price of goods and services 
and the particular quantity demanded at each price which is based on the theory of consumer 
choice. The quantity demanded is the quantity of goods or services that a consumer or group of 
consumers plan to buy at a certain price and time. There are two main factors that influence the 
demand for a good: taste and ability to buy. Taste, which is the relative desirability of various 
combinations of goods and services, determines the willingness to buy goods or services at a 
specific price. Ability to buy means that an individual must possess sufficient wealth or income 
in order to purchase the goods or services at specific prices. Both factors of demand depend on 
the market price. 
Consumer behavior is analyzed through utility maximization subject to a budgetary constraint. 
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According to this theory, an individual has a utility function, U(x), which is a function of 
non-negative commodity vectors, x = (x1, x2… xn), and seeks to maximize U(x) subject to their 
budgetary constraint. There is a set of commodities that can achieve utility maximum given the 
budget constraint, B(p, w) = {x ∈ X | p · x ≤ w}, where p represents prices and w represents 
wealth. Assuming that prices and wealth are strictly positive, the consumer’s problem can be 
written as: 
0≥X
Max U(x)   s.t.  p · x ≤ w.       (3.1.1) 
Since this is a constrained maximization problem, the Lagrangian method can be used. The 
Lagrangian can be written as: 
L = U (x) + λ (w − p · x)                                                                     (3.1.2) 
Where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint. 
This implies Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions (FOC) of: 
Ui (x ∗ ) − λ ∗  pi ≤ 0 and xi (Ui (x ∗ ) −   λ ∗ pi) = 0 for i = (1,..., L) 
w − p · x ∗  ≥ 0 and λ ∗ (w − p · x ∗ ) = 0      (3.1.3) 
Let x ∗  be the utility maximizing commodity vector. If prices and wealth were different, the 
utility maximizing point would have been different. For this reason, the endogenous variable, x ∗ , 
is written as a function of prices and wealth, x (p, w) = (x1 (p, w), x2 (p, w)..., xL (p, w)). This 
function gives the utility maximizing bundle for any values of p and w, x (p, w) and is called the 
consumer’s demand function. A consumer’s demand function represents the amount that a 
consumer will purchase as a function of prices and available income (Luenberger, 1995). When 
the market price for a product is high, subsequent demand will be low. When price is low, 
subsequent demand is high. At depressed prices, many consumers will be able to purchase a 
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product. However, people usually only want a limited amount of any one particular good. The 
law of diminishing marginal utility states that acquiring additional increments of a good or 
service in some time period will contribute decreasing levels of satisfaction. As a result, the 
demand for a product at low prices is limited by taste and is not infinite even when the price 
equals zero. As the price increases, the same amount of money will purchase fewer goods. When 
the price of a good is very high, the demand will decrease because, while consumers may have a 
strong desire to purchase a product, they are limited by their ability to buy. 
3.1.1.2. Producer Theory 
Supply is the relationship between the price of a good and the quantity supplied by producers. In 
many ways, supply is analogous to demand. Willingness and ability to supply goods determine 
the seller’s actions. Just as consumers constitute the demand side of the product market, firms 
represent the supply side. A firm is an economic agent that converts factors of production (land, 
labor, and capital) into goods and services. In the process, firms make numerous decisions 
including what to produce, how much to produce, what inputs to purchase, and what technology 
to use to produce their product. Economists model a firm’s decisions with the goal of 
maximizing profit. Every decision impacts the benefits to a firm, and is typically measured in 
terms of revenue but also entails cost. The difference between the revenue generated from a 
decision and the cost incurred is the profit earned from adopting that particular decision. This 
general concept is the same regardless of the decision being analyzed. It is important to 
accurately measure the benefits and the costs of various decisions. There are two types of costs 
that firms incur. Variable costs are those costs that change directly with output. Fixed costs are 
those costs that the firm incurs regardless of how much or how little it chooses to produce. Total 
cost is the sum of variable and fixed costs. Another useful measure that helps firms determine 
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their level of production is marginal cost, which is the change in total cost after producing an 
additional unit of output. In general, profit maximizing firms will produce output until their 
marginal cost is just equal to their marginal revenue. At this point, the firm’s profit is 
maximized, although it is not guaranteed to be positive. 
Producer theory is based on profit maximization. According to this theory, producers will 
choose from among all possible alternatives that strategy which maximizes earned profits. In that 
case, a firm that is seeking to produce a quantity, q, of an output will look for the set of inputs, z, 
that maximizes its profit. The relationship between q and z is given by q = f(z). The profit 
maximization problem can be written as:  
0≥Z
Max  pq – w.z  s.t : f(z) ≥ q.            (3.1.4)         
Where p>0 is the price of the output and w = (w1, w2,…, wn) ≥ 0 the n prices of the inputs z. 
Since p>0, the constraint is always binding and equation 3.1.4 can be rewritten as an 
unconstrained maximization:  
0≥Z
Max  pq – w.z           (3.1.5) 
This can be translated as the maximization of the difference between the revenue the firm 
generates from sales, and the total cost of sold output.  
The Kuhn-Tucker first order conditions to maximize (3.1.5) can be derived as follows: 
Pfi (z*) - wi ≤ 0 
Pfi (z*) - wi = 0 if zi* > 0,  i                                           (3.1.6)            
fi (z*) is the marginal product of input zi, and indicates the amount by which revenue increases if 
input zi is increased by a small amount. Thus Pfi (z*) is the amount by which revenue increases if 
zi is increased by a small amount and is also referred to as the marginal revenue product. The 
optimality condition means that the increase in revenue due to a small increase in zi must be less 
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than the increase in the cost and that when zi* > 0, then the increase in revenue must exactly 
equal the increase in cost.  
If we consider two inputs zi* and zj* that are strictly positive, 3.1.6 can be rearranged to 
give: 
fi (z*)/ fj (z*) = 
j
i
W
W
                                                    (3.1.7) 
This means that the marginal rate of technical substitution between two inputs is equal to the 
ratio of their price. In addition 3.1.6 can be restated as: 
pf ’(z*) = w or f ‘ (z*) = 
P
W                                                    (3.1.8) 
Solving this problem will lead to the factor demand function z (w, p) which shows how much of 
the inputs are used at prices p and w. If z (w, p) is inserted into the production function q = f (z), 
it gives q(w,p) = f(z(w,p)), known as the supply function. 
At higher prices, more quantity of that respective commodity will be available to buyers. 
This is because suppliers will be able to maintain a profit despite the higher costs of production 
that may result from short-term expansion of their capacity. In a market, when the inventory is 
less than the desired inventory, manufacturers will raise both the supply of their product and its 
price. The short-term increase in supply causes manufacturing costs to rise, leading to a further 
increase in price. The price change in turn increases the desired rate of production. A similar 
effect occurs if inventory is too high. Neoclassical economic theory approximates this 
complicated process through the supply curve.  
3.1.2. Bilateral Monopoly-Theory Review 
A bilateral monopoly situation is said to arise when there is a single seller and a single buyer of a 
particular commodity. The seller produces an intermediate product and sells it to the buyer who 
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uses it as an input in producing a final output (Gervais and Devadoss). There has been a 
historical divergence of opinion concerning the correct outcome under bilateral monopoly and a 
clear consensus has yet to emerge. The major source of confusion stems from a failure to 
recognize the importance of joint profit maximization through negotiation on both the price and 
the quantity of the intermediate good (Blair, Kaserman, and Romano). The description of a 
bilateral monopoly characterizes quite well the quota market which this analysis seeks to model. 
Suppose that countries which are no longer competitive under the prevailing EU price ( quota 
sellers) stop producing and instead sell their quota rights to the countries that can still make 
profit (quota buyers). These quota rights serve as an intermediate product for the buyer who will 
then use it to produce the final output, which is sugar. Because the ACP sugar protocol is 
between the EU and a specific number of countries, the sellers possess the quota and are the only 
ones that can sell them.  Likewise, there are a limited number of buyers.  
The general model is defined as follows: The seller has q amount of the intermediate 
product available to sell to the buyer who will use it to produce y amount of output. One unit of q 
allows for the production of one unit of y. Per unit prices of q and y are respectively, p and r. The 
seller’s profit π s and the buyer’s profit π b are given by  
π s = pq – c1(q)         (3.1.9) 
π b = rf(q) – c2(q) - pq        (3.1.10) 
Where c1(q) represents the seller’s cost function, c2(q) is the buyer’s cost function and f(q) 
represents buyer’s production function. 
Four different cases can arise in the determination of equilibrium quantity and price: 
1- The monopoly case in which the seller dominates the market and makes the buyer accept 
his price and quantity decisions. 
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2- The monopsony case in which the buyer dominates the market and forces the seller to 
follow his price and quantity decisions. 
3- Collusion by the seller and the buyer in which they determine the equilibrium quantity 
and price by maximizing their joint profit. 
4- Noncooperation by the seller and the buyer which results in market failure. 
Let us examine each case individually: 
Suppose the buyer can dictate the price of the intermediate product: The seller will offer 
q units so that q maximizes pq – c1(q), p being given. 
Monopoly Case 
p
Max (pq – c1(q))         (3.1.11) 
dq
sdπ = p-c1’(q) = 0  p = c1’(q) = Offer schedule     (3.1.12) 
The seller’s gain would then be c1’(q) q - c1(q)     (3.1.13) 
The buyer who is then limited by the seller’s offer schedule and demand for y dictates p which 
will maximize rf(q) – c2(q)- pq =  rf(q) – c2(q) - c1’(q) q  
dq
bdπ = rf’(q) -  c’2(q) – c’1 (q) – q c''1 (q) =0     (3.1.14) 
This equation is solved for q* and the value of q* is replaced in the offer schedule to obtain p*. 
We can now determine the gain to the buyer which is rf(q*) – c2(q*) – p*q*. 
Suppose the seller of the intermediate product can dictate its price p to the buyer. The 
buyer maximizes its profit rf(q) – c2(q) – pq for a given p. 
Monopsony case 
dq
d sπ = rf’(q) –  c’2(q)  – p =0  p = rf’(q) –  c’2(q) = demand schedule  (3.1.15) 
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The buyer’s gain is then rf(q) – c2(q) – (rf’(q) –  c’2(q))q.    (3.1.16) 
The seller, who is then limited by the buyer’s demand schedule and his own cost schedule, 
dictates the value of p which will maximize pq – c1(q) =  (rf’(q) –  c’2(q)) q - c1(q) 
dq
d sπ = (rf’’(q) –  c’’2(q))q +  (rf’(q) –  c’2(q)) -  c’1 (q) = 0     (3.1.17) 
This equation is solved to determine q* and the value of q* is replaces q in the demand schedule 
to obtain p*. 
We can now determine the seller’s gain:  p*q* – c1(q*) 
Suppose that the buyer and the seller of a quota combine to maximize their joint gain 
through bargaining. Many authors reported that optimality in the case of a bilateral monopoly 
requires joint profit maximization. Henderson and Quandt argue that the bargaining process can 
be separated into two steps. First, participants determine a quantity that maximizes their joint 
profit, and then, secondly, determine a price that distributes the joint profit among them. 
Collusion 
Joint profit is given by: 
π = π s + π b = [rf(q) – c2(q) - pq] + [pq – c1(q)] = rf(q) – c2(q) – c1(q)   (3.1.18) 
Joint profit maximization provides only the optimum quantity. Price has to be determined 
through negotiation.  
dq
dπ
= rf’(q) -  c’2(q) - c’1 (q)=0  rf’(q) -  c’2(q) = c’1 (q)    (3.1.19) 
Equation (3.1.19) shows that the optimal collusive output, q*, is obtained by equating the seller’s 
marginal cost to the buyer’s marginal value product. For the prescribed quantity, the seller 
desires the highest possible price and the buyer desires the lowest possible price. Price cannot be  
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set beyond the price that would force the buyer’s profit to zero which is equal to 
q
qcqrf )()( 2−  
and represents the upper limit and the condition that would force the seller’s profit to zero is 
equal to 
q
qc )(1  and represents the lower limit because a negative profit would force one of the 
firms to discontinue operations. The determination of a specific price within the bargaining limits 
will depend upon the relative bargaining power of the buyer and seller (Henderson and 
Quandt).The incentive to pursue joint profit maximization arises because joint profits are not 
maximized at either of the two boundaries solutions presented in the above standard analysis  
(Blair, Kaserman, and Romano). 
This is the case where neither seller nor buyer is willing to behave as a price taker which may 
lead to market breakdown. 
Non-cooperation 
3.2. Methodology 
3.2.1. Supply and Demand Estimation 
The Nerlove model has been widely used to examine supply and demand responses to price and 
other incentives. Nerlove (1958) distinguished between short-run and long-run supply and 
demand elasticities and argues that it is impossible to measure the short-run elasticity of supply 
or demand and that the long-run elasticity can be measured under special conditions. He 
concludes that there is no unique short-run elasticity of supply or demand with respect to price or 
any other variable because short-run elasticity differs depending on the position from which we 
start and the length of time we allow for adjustment. He goes on to point out that “whenever it 
takes time for producers or consumers to adjust to changed conditions and wherever the period 
which is required for full adjustment exceeds the interval of observation, then statistical 
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relationships among observations on the relevant variables, each of which is taken at the same 
time, tell us little about the long-run elasticity or any of the short-run elasticities.” A distributed 
lag model was introduced as a suitable method for analyzing dynamic models of consumer and 
producer behavior.  The Nerlove models of demand and supply are, respectively: 
Qt = aγPt + bγYt + (1 - γ) Qt-1 + cγ       (3.2.1) 
Xt = dγPt-1 + (1 - γ) Xt-1 + e, where        (3.2.2) 
With Qt represents Current quantity consumed or its logarithm, Pt represents Current price or its 
logarithm, Pt-1represents Price of the commodity lagged one year, Yt represents Current income 
or its logarithm, γ represents Constant of proportionality which is the elasticity or coefficient of 
adjustment according to whether quantity is expressed in logarithms or not, a and d represents 
Long-run price elasticity, b represents Long-run income elasticity, c represents Constant, Xt 
represents Current planned output, Xt-1 represents Current planned output lagged one year. 
This model has been modified and extensively revised by numerous authors that were 
investigating the supply and demand function. 
In this study, the structure of the country’s model framework includes behavioral 
equations for area harvested, yield, and production on the supply side, and per capita 
consumption and ending stocks on the demand side. All of the countries in the ACP sugar group 
have trade relations with countries other than EU countries. In some cases, the volume of exports 
to those countries is higher than their quota. It is therefore important to determine whether these 
countries respond to world prices or EU prices.  
The general framework for each country’s model consists of the following: 
AHt = f(AHt-1, Pt-1, t)          (3.2.3) 
Area Harvested at time t 
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Yt = f(Yt-1, t)           (3.2.4) 
Yield at time t 
PRDt = AHt* Yt          (3.2.5) 
Production at time t 
Where AHt   is acreage harvvested at time t, AHt-1 is lagged area harvested, Pt-1 is lagged producer 
price at time t, Yt is yield at time t, Yt-1 is lagged yield, PRDt is production at time t. Yield 
improvements are captured by the time trend. 
PCCt = f(Pt, PCIt, PCCt-1)         (3.2.6) 
Per capita consumption at time t 
With PCCt being per capita consumption at time t, Pt is the real consumer price of raw sugar at 
time t and PCIt   representing real income per capita at time t. Total demand is the product of the 
population and per capita consumption. The consumer price index is used to change nominal 
variables into real variables. 
ESt = f(ESt-1, PRDt, CONt, EXPt, Pt)        (3.2.7) 
Inventory demand at time t is 
With ESt representing ending stock at time t, CONt  representing consumption at time t , PRDt is 
production at time t, EXPt is exports at time t and Pt is the producer price at time t. 
Data for area harvested, yield and sugarcane production were gathered from the Food and 
Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, and data for sugar production, 
consumption and ending stocks were obtained from Production, Supply and Distribution (PS&D) 
View of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). Macroeconomic data such as real 
GDP, consumer price index, population and exchange rates were gathered from various sources 
including the USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS). Price data were obtained from the  
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USDA and the World Bank. The time period considered is from 1975 to 2005.  
3.2.2. Derivation of Transfer Benefits 
This study assumes that world price is exogenously given, implying that the EU sugar reform is 
represented as lowering only domestic and preferential prices, and leading to a net income 
reduction for all protocol countries. We initially estimate the profit of ACP sugar protocol 
exporters associated with the old regime. We derive the estimates using the notion of a profit 
function. Next we estimate the profit associated with the EU sugar reform. This will allow us to 
assess the competitiveness of the ACP sugar protocol exporters and determine the countries that 
are going to cease their sugar production.  
The methodology that we use to identify the net transfer benefit to the ACP countries of 
the sugar protocol before and after reform is different from earlier studies. Most previous studies 
identified the gross transfer benefit under the protocol (Milner, Morgan and Zgovu) but, in our 
study, we depart from this approach and estimate the net transfer benefit based on the notion of 
profit. Our purpose is to first show the actual benefit that ACP countries are getting and then 
examine how the CAP sugar reform is going to affect their net gain. We consider the sugar 
industry in each country as a firm without disaggregating individual farmers. Furthermore, we 
assume that each industry behaves as a profit maximizing firm. The assumption of profit 
maximization is used to predict which countries will continue operating their sugar industry and 
which countries will cease sugar production. We use the profit function property that suggests 
that there be no losses (i.e.   0) as a way to determine the countries decisions. This means that 
an industry will not tolerate negative profit. In other words, if faced with negative profit, an 
industry will stop all production. The firm’s profit, , is the difference between revenue and cost. 
Here revenue is the unit price times quantity: R = PQ. The cost is transaction cost plus 
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production cost. This gives: 
 = R(q) – C(q)          (3.2.8) 
3.2.3. A Model of Trade of Quota Rights 
The sugar industries of the ACP sugar protocol countries face severe challenges in the coming 
years as a result of the EU sugar policy reform. There are some countries that will not be able to 
survive the reform and some that will survive but will see their export revenues reduced. The 
countries that are no longer profitable may continue to support their sugar industries for a time, 
but will eventually be cease production.   
The model of quota trade developed allows for the countries that can no longer profitably 
export to the European Union to sell their quota rights to the countries that are still able to make 
profit. This alternative is very promising in that it will give the potential sellers the opportunity 
to immediately obtain revenues that can be used for diversification away from sugar. However 
because in the past when a country was unable to fulfill its quota rights, the European Union 
would divide the amount among the active countries, the potential buyers might be tempted to 
wait for the high cost producing countries to close their sugar industries so that they can benefit 
from a redistribution of their quota as it has always been.  Even so, there are many reasons for 
the potential buyer to want to participate in the negotiations. First, it is likely that the potential 
sellers will not close their sugar industries at the same time making it more profitable for the 
potential buyers to consider the quota market model which will allow them to get additional 
revenue quickly and adjust to the loss of revenues that they will be experiencing. This also opens 
up the possibility of production expansion and ultimately cost reduction and, hence, more profits. 
Second, there is the risk that the European Union will further reform its sugar policy. There has 
been pressure for the European Union to completely eliminate its exports subsidies and in the 
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event that this happens, the price will decrease further.  As a result, the ACP sugar protocol 
countries will experience further reduction in their exports revenues. Given this, it may be 
important for the potential buyers to take advantage of the opportunities that they now have 
because there is no telling what the future holds.   
The analysis is an adaptation of the above standard joint profit maximization model. 
Following the work of Dasgupta and Devadoss, we assume unequal bargaining power. The cause 
of differential market power is attributed to the fact that the buyer may find a substitute market 
which is the rest of the world. In fact the buyer can give up the option to buy the quota from the 
other ACP countries and increase sales to the EU and decide to produce and sell its product on 
the world market. The seller, in contrast, does not have an alternative market for its quota rights 
other than the sugar protocol countries. Having the world market as an alternative gives buyers 
slightly superior bargaining power. Because the world market price of sugar is volatile, ACP 
sugar protocol countries face volatile export earnings. With price stability being the major goal 
of the EU agricultural policy, ACP countries gain from the preferential agreement because of 
stabilized export earnings (Herrmann, Weiss). Furthermore, we suppose that the substitute world 
market is imperfect, which is consistent with the need for collusion where the buyer has to 
negotiate with the seller because of the opportunity to get a higher mark up through the ACP 
sugar protocol. Therefore, despite the availability of other markets, the underlying bilateral 
monopoly structure is unchanged beyond inducing unequal bargaining powers. 
Following Dasgupta and Devadoss, we assume that the buyer and the seller determine the 
optimal price and quantity profile of the intermediate product by maximizing the product of each 
party’s profits, weighted by their respective bargaining powers.  
Let  (01) and (1- ) represent the seller’s and buyer’s bargaining power, respectively. 
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Max π s  . π  (1-)b = [pq – c1(q)] . [rf(q) - pq – c2(q)](1-)     (3.2.9) 
The first order condition with respect to price of the intermediate product is: 
.p [pq – c1(q)]-1 . [rf(q) - pq – c2(q)](1-) - (1- ).p [rf(q) - pq – c2(q)]- . [pq – c1(q)] =0 
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If we substitute q* into (3.2.10) for q and solve for the intermediate product’s price, the solution 
is: 
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 .(rf(q*) – pq* – c2(q*)) = (1- ). (pq* – c1(q*)) 
 rf(q*) –  pq* –  c2(q*) = (1- ) . pq* – (1- ) . c1(q*) 
 rf(q*) –  c2(q*) + (1- ) . c1(q*) = (1- ) . pq* +  pq* 
 rf(q*) –  c2(q*) + (1- ) . c1(q*) = pq* 
*
*)(*)( 2
q
qcqrf −
β +
*
*)()1( 1
q
qc
β− = p*      (3.2.11)  
Thus the price of the intermediate product is dependent on . 
We can now derive the buyer’s and the seller’s profit corresponding to p* and q*: 
*)*,( qpsπ = p*q* - c1(q*)  
     = [ (rf(q*)– c2(q*)) + (1- ) c1(q*)] - c1(q*) 
44 
 
= [rf(q*)– c2(q*) - c1(q*)] = π       (3.2.12) 
*)*,( qpbπ = rf(q*) – p*q* – c2(q*) 
        = rf(q*) - [ (rf(q*)– c2(q*)) + (1- ) c1(q*)] – c2(q*) 
       = (1- ) [rf(q*)– c2(q*)– c1(q*) ] = (1- ) π     (3.2.13) 
Equations (3.2.12) and (3.2.13) show that seller and buyer divide total profits proportional to 
their respective bargaining power. Furthermore, it shows that the country with superior 
bargaining power receives a greater share of the total profit, proportional to its bargaining power. 
This result will be used to determine the bargaining powers and then determine prices and profits 
that prevail in each case. 
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CHAPTER4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
4.1. Econometric Estimation 
4.1.1. Model Specification and Validation 
This section examines the supply and demand responsiveness of fourteen of the ACP countries to 
the sugar protocol. Annual data for 1975 through 2005 are used for the analysis. The general 
supply and demand models outlined previously were estimated for these 14 countries that are 
still active in the sugar protocol. Adjustments to the standard models have been made in some 
cases in order to get satisfactory results. To determine whether autocorrelation correction is 
needed, the Durbin Watson or Durbin h statistics were used. The Durbin Watson test is a widely 
used method of testing for autocorrelation but when lagged dependent variables are included as 
explanatory variables, the Durbin Watson statistic is not valid, and the appropriate test statistic is 
the Durbin h statistic.   
4.1.1.1 Time Series Data and Autocorrelation 
Economic time series are often characterized by autocorrelation. Autocorrelation occurs when 
the error term observations in a regression are correlated. When autocorrelation is present, the 
OLS estimates do not have the minimum variance (not efficient estimates). Also OLS will 
underestimate the standard errors of the coefficients leading to larger t-statistics and incorrect 
decisions in hypothesis testing. 
4.1.1.2 The Durbin-Watson, the Durbin h and t Tests 
The Durbin-Watson test, first published in 1950, has been found to be extremely useful in testing 
for serial correlation. Consider the residuals et from an OLS regression with T observations. To 
test H0 that the errors are uncorrelated against the alternative hypothesis H1 that the errors are AR 
(1), the DW test statistic is defined as: 
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     (4.1.1.1) 
The cutoff between the acceptance and the rejection region is not clear, as an inconclusive region 
is present. Therefore, the DW test relies on two limits, dl and du. In a two-tailed test, where both 
positive and negative autocorrelation are tested, the null hypothesis (of absence of serial 
correlation) is rejected for values of d below dl or above 4- dl, and we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis for values between du and 4 - du. The test is inconclusive for values between dl and du 
or between 4- du and 4- dl.  
When an explanatory variable in the regression is a lagged dependent variable, the DW 
statistic will be biased toward 2 (acceptance of the null hypothesis) even when the errors are 
serially correlated. In order to solve this problem, Durbin (1970) proposed a modification, the h 
test, which under the null hypothesis is approximately normally distributed with unit variance. 
The test statistic is defined as: 
      (4.1.1.2) 
Where  is the estimated variance of the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable and T is 
the sample size in the regression. 
Durbin’s h test cannot be used for T  ≥ 1. In this case, Durbin (1970) proposed another 
statistic, the t test. The latter consists of performing the original OLS regression, collecting the 
residuals and running the following regression: 
et = β1 +  β2Xt + β3Yt-1 + β4et-1 +  µt    (4.1.1.3) 
Where Yt-1 is the lagged dependent variable, and Xt is the (vector of) independent variable(s). 
Serial correlation is tested by using the t-value of the β4 coefficient.  
4.1.2 Empirical Estimation Results  
4.1.2.1 Supply Response 
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This section presents the results of the estimation of the supply function. This is done to 
determine the factors that affect the decisions of farmers in the ACP sugar protocol countries.  
The regression for some countries showed the presence of autocorrelation and, in order to deal 
with this issue, we assumed that the error terms follow a first-order autoregressive pattern1
Four standard linear and log linear specifications of area harvested and two standard 
linear and log linear specifications of yield are estimated for each country
. The 
maximum likelihood was used as an estimation technique. Estimations were made with both 
linear and log-linear formulations and the results are mostly reported in linear formulations but in 
some cases the log linear formulations were reported because they yielded better results. 
Different functional forms give parameter estimates that have different economic interpretation. 
The parameters of the linear model have an interpretation as marginal effects. The elasticities 
will vary depending on the data. In contrast, the parameters of the log-log model are directly 
interpreted as elasticities. So the log-log model assumes a constant elasticity over all values of 
the data set.  
2
Yt = Yt (T)       (4.1.2.6) 
. Equations 4.1.2.1 
through 4.1.2.4 are the area harvested equations and the yield equations are given as 4.1.2.5 and 
4.1.2.6.   
AHt = AHt (AHt-1, PEUt-1, T)     (4.1.2.1) 
AHt = AHt (AHt-1, PWt-1, T)     (4.1.2.2) 
AHt = AHt (AHt-1, PEUt-1)     (4.1.2.3) 
AHt = AHt (AHt-1, PWt-1)     (4.1.2.4) 
Yt = Yt (Yt-1, T)      (4.1.2.5) 
                                                 
1 The assumption of the first order autoregressive pattern was made since we are only using a one year lag. 
2 For a detailed discussion on the different specifications of the supply model see Askari and Cummings (1977). 
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Where AHt   is acreage harvested at time t (hectares), AHt-1 is lagged area harvested, PEUt-1 and 
PWt-1 are respectively the lagged EU and World sugar price converted using the real exchange 
rate or CPI of the country in question, Yt is yield at time t (hectogram per hectares),Yt-1 is lagged 
yield, and T denoting time period. PEU and PW are either in Local currency per pound or cents 
per pound depending on whether the exchange rates or the consumer price indexes were used.  
Dummies were included in the equations whenever the estimation results did not perform as 
expected. The parameter estimates are shown in the results below.  
4.1.2.1.1 Area Harvested 
In the area harvested equation, the coefficient of lagged area harvested is positive and 
significantly different from 0 for twelve (Barbados, Belize, Ivory Coast, Congo, Fiji, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Swaziland, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, and Zimbabwe) of 
the fourteen countries studied. The sign of the coefficient implies a positive lag distribution of 
area harvested. The exceptions are Guyana and Jamaica, where the estimated coefficient is not 
statistically different from zero. The price coefficient showed mixed results. It is positive and 
statistically different form zero in Barbados, Belize, Ivory Coast, Guyana, Jamaica, Swaziland, 
and Trinidad and Tobago, implying that producers are responsive to price in these countries. In 
Fiji, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe the price coefficient is positive 
and not significant, but negative and not significant in Congo. This finding can be interpreted to 
show that supply is not responsive to price in these countries. This might be explained by the fact 
that the price and quantities have already been negotiated in the sugar protocol and the 
production by these countries is for the preferential markets provided by the EU and U.S. quotas. 
Therefore, it is possible that these countries make their production plans without taking into 
account the fluctuations in price because they have a guaranteed price.  
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Table 4.1.2.1. Coefficient estimates of the area harvested and yield 
Barbados  
Yt =   514690 + 0.17Yt-1 - 2822 T 
           (4.29)***   (0.91)       (-2.09) ** 
N = 31           R2 = 0.2356                  Dt= 1.1591 
 
AHt = -366.12 +  0.93 AHt-1 + 1182 PEUt-1  
  (-1.28)    (28.58)***  (2.49) **      
N = 31  R2 = 0.9870                 Dh= - 2.6271 
 
Belize 
Yt = 572492 - 0.49Yt-1 + 4444 T 
       (8.46)***   (-3.14) ***      (2.87) ***       
N = 31           R2 = 0.3662             Dt= 0.6220 
 
LnAHt =  3.45  +   0.66 LnA Ht-1 + 0.08 LnPEUt-1  - 0.0006 T 
     (3.28)***   (6.39) ***           (2.00)*  (-0.95)   
N = 31  R2 = 0.7431              Dt =-0.5226 
 
Ivory Coast 
Yt =   45427 + 0.28Yt-1 + 0.10T   
      (4.84)***    (1.85)*     (0.00)    
N = 31           R2 =   0.1246       Dh= 1.2880 
 
LnAHt = 1.15+ 0.82LnA Ht-1 + 0. 18LnPEUt-1  
 (1.13)        (11.29) ***     (1.59)        
N = 31  R2 =  0.8683   Dh = 1.4970 
 
Congo 
Yt = 10678 + 0.77Yt-1 - 41.24 T 
       (1.72)* (6.86) ***  (-0.44)  
N = 31           R2 =   0.7199 
 
AHt = 6261+ 0.95A Ht-1 - 20.62PEUt-1   
         (2.33)**  (30.93)*** (-1.59)       
N = 31  R2 = 0.9750    
Ln is the natural logarithm of a variable 
Dh is the Durbin’s h statistic 
Dt is the Durbin’s t statistic 
*** Significantly different from 0 at 99% level of significance 
** Significantly different from 0 at 95% level of significance 
* Significantly different from 0 at 90% level of significance 
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Table 4.1.2.1. continued 
Fiji 
Yt  =   88058  - 0.60Yt-1 - 313.49T 
        (9.89)*** (-3.84)***   (-2.33)** 
N = 31         R2 =    0.4106              Dt= - 0.5953 
 
LnAHt=   2.58 +  0.77 LnA Ht-1  +   0.09LnPEUt-1   
             (2.76)**      (8.96)***            (0.96)          
N = 31  R2 = 0.7861               Dh= - 1.8687 
 
Guyana 
Yt =  76883 -  494.43T 
       (26.72)***   (-3.17)*** 
N = 31           R2 =     0.27              DW=0.9484 
 
AHt =  49774 - 0.12A Ht-1 +  6.14PWt-1 
          (6.66)***      (-0.78)   (3.72)***         
N = 31  R2 =  0.3634            Dh= 0.9816 
 
Jamaica 
Yt =   39431+ 0.40Yt-1 - 236.48 T  
         (3.30)*** (2.20)**    (-1.90)*     
N = 31          R2 =    0.3473                       Dt= 0.1713 
 
AHt = 21005  - 0.22 AHt-1   + 49.38PEUt-1  +  913.52T 
         (2.16)**   (-1.55) (5.25) ***  (2.87) *** 
N = 31  R2 =  0.6333                        Dt=0.5648 
 
Madagascar 
Yt =    13262+ 0.69Yt-1 + 311.54T  
         (2.43)**   (4.78) *** (1.50)  
N = 31           R2 =      0.8677                     Dt=-0.2691 
 
AHt =    0.58+  0.94A Ht-1 + 0.006PEUt-1 - 0.53DUM82 +  0.37DUM83 
           (0.56)    (10.95)***  (0.30)            (-11.62)***       (6.84)*** 
N = 31  R2 =   0.9659                       Dh=1.9790 
 
Ln is the natural logarithm of a variable 
DW is the Durbin’s Watson statistic 
Dh is the Durbin’s h statistic 
Dt is the Durbin’s t statistic 
*** Significantly different from 0 at 99% level of significance 
** Significantly different from 0 at 95% level of significance 
* Significantly different from 0 at 90% level of significance 
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Table 4.1.2.1. continued 
Malawi 
Yt =   48982 +  0.58Yt-1  - 200.92 T 
        (2.71)** (3.69)***   (-1.61) 
N = 31          R2 = 0.5525                           Dt=  0.1118 
 
LnAHt = 5.20 + 0.37LnAHt-1 + 0.08LnPEUt-1 + 0.03LnT 
   (3.97)***    (2.16)**      (1.45)     (2.29)**   
N = 31  R2 = 0.9033                        Dh=0.5834 
 
Mauritius 
 Yt =  802026 -  0.10Yt-1 +  39.04T -139646DUM99 
         (7.24)***   (-0.66)        (0.05)           (-2.74)** 
N = 31          R2 = 0.3318)              Dh= 0.1732 
 
AHt =    2175+ 0.96A Ht-1 + 47.93PEUt-1  
   (0.34)  (10.34)***  (0.88)    
N = 31  R2 =    0.95               DW=1.92 
 
Swaziland 
Yt =     107320 - 323.88T  
          (39.03)***  (-2.18) **    
N = 31          R2 = 0.1495                    DW=0.9552 
 
LnAHt =    1.11+ 0.88LnA Ht-1 + 0.05LnPWt-1 + 0.006LnT 
       (1.06)    (8.82)***         (1.54)         (1.93)* 
N = 31  R2 =    0.9640                Dh=1.3468 
 
Tanzania 
Yt =      20487 + 0.73Yt-1 + 354.2 T 
           (2.36)**  (5.70)***     (1.05)  
N = 31          R2 = 0.7563                        Dh=1.3972 
 
AHt =   3997 + 0.73AHt-1 + 0.14 PWt-1  
          (2.26)**   (6.49)*** (1.17)    
N = 31  R2 = 0.7890                      Dh=1.6746 
Ln is the natural logarithm of a variable 
Dh is the Durbin’s h statistic 
Dt is the Durbin’s t statistic 
*** Significantly different from 0 at 99% level of significance 
** Significantly different from 0 at 95% level of significance 
* Significantly different from 0 at 90% level of significance 
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Table 4.1.2.1. continued 
Trinidad 
Yt  =   78832 - 0.39Yt-1 - 79.97T 
         (6.87)***  (-2.19)**  (-0.24)   
N = 31          R2 = 0.1639                   Dh= 1.3297 
 
AHt =   7555 + 0.36AHt-1 + 1460PEUt-1  
  (2.05)*  (1.94)*         (2.55)**       
N = 31  R2 =   0.5371                Dh= 3.3861 
 
Zimbabwe 
Yt =    121577  -0.08Yt-1 -811.18T- 99512DUM84- -50108DUM85 
           (6.17)*** (-0.47)     (-3.39)***  (-10.86)***      (-2.43)** 
N = 31         R2 = 0.9174                         Dh= -0.6935 
 
AHt = 5803 + 0.67LAHt-1 + 1.82 LPWt-1 + 285.17T 
  (1.16)    (4.51)***   (0.63)         (1.53)       
N = 31  R2 =   0.6930                      Dh= 1.7265 
Ln is the natural logarithm of a variable 
Dh is the Durbin’s h statistic 
*** Significantly different from 0 at 99% level of significance 
** Significantly different from 0 at 95% level of significance 
* Significantly different from 0 at 90% level of significance 
 
4.1.2.1.2 Yield 
The yield equation was estimated using lagged yield and/or time. The lag distribution was 
positive and significant for Ivory Coast, Congo, Jamaica, Madagascar, Malawi, and Tanzania 
suggesting that the first lagged value of yield helps predict current yield. However, three 
countries (Belize, Fiji, and Trinidad and Tobago) showed a negative and significant lag 
distribution implying that yield follows a decline through time. The coefficient of the lagged 
variable was not significant for Barbados, Mauritius, and Zimbabwe. The estimated time trend 
variable used to capture technological improvement is positive and significant in only one 
country (Belize) implying that there was technological advancement in Belize’s sugar industry.  
Interestingly, the coefficient was negative and significant in Barbados, Fiji, Guyana, Jamaica, 
Swaziland, and Zimbabwe. It was not significant in Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mauritius, 
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Tanzania, Congo, Malawi, and Trinidad and Tobago. This suggests that there might have been 
some natural disasters, neglect or a deterioration of the infrastructure in those countries sugar 
industries. For instance, Gafar, while estimating the supply responsiveness of Trinidad for sugar 
cane found that the trend variable was negative and pointed that the Caribbean sugar industry 
had not had any major capital investment designed to prevent soil erosion, improve irrigation, 
develop new varieties of sugar cane, or educate farmers on good practices. The obtained results 
provide strong support for the view that the sugar protocol did not improve the sugar industries 
of the ACP countries. 
4.1.2.2 Demand 
The procedure was similar to the supply case. Similar to the area harvested, we have three 
different linear and log linear specifications of ending stocks for each country. Equations 4.1.2.7 
through 4.1.2.9 are the ending stock equations, and per capita consumption is given as 4.1.2.10. 
The formulations that yielded acceptable results are the ones that are being presented. A time 
trend and dummies were included in the equations whenever the estimation results did not 
perform as expected. 
ESt = ESt (ESt-1, PRDt, CONt, EXPt, PEUt )    (4.1.2.7) 
ESt = ESt (ESt-1, PRDt, CONt, EXPt, PWt )    (4.1.2.8) 
ESt = ESt (ESt-1, PRDt, CONt, EXPt)     (4.1.2.9) 
PCCt = PCCt (PCCt-1, PCIt, Pt)     (4.1.2.10) 
With ESt representing ending stock at time t (tonnes), CONt  representing consumption at time t 
(tonnes), PRDt is production at time t (tonnes), EXPt is exports at time t (tonnes). PEUt  and PWt 
are EU and world price at time t respectively expressed in local currency per pound or cent per 
pound. PCCt is per capita consumption at time t (tonnes), Pt is the real consumer price of raw 
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sugar at time t (cent per pound), and PCIt   representing real income per capita at time t (US 
dollars). ESt-1 and PCCt-1 are lagged ending stock and per capita consumption respectively. 
4.1.2.2.1 Per Capita Consumption 
The estimated lag variable of per capita consumption was positive and statistically different from 
zero for all of the countries studied. The results of per capita income are significantly different 
from zero and have the expected sign (positive) for Barbados, Congo, Fiji, Jamaica, Malawi, 
Swaziland, and Tanzania. For the linear formulation this translates into: A dollar increase in 
income will increase sugar consumption by x tons (x being the value of the coefficient). The log 
linear formulation can be interpreted as follows: A one per cent increase in income will increase 
consumption by x per cent with x being the value of the coefficient. Unfortunately, the 
coefficient for income was not significant in Belize, Ivory Coast, Guyana, Madagascar, 
Mauritius, Trinidad and Tobago, and Zimbabwe. This suggests that consumption is not income 
elastic in these countries. The coefficients of price are as expected (negative) and significantly 
different from zero in Barbados, Congo, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. Perhaps the most 
surprising result is that the coefficient was positive and significant in Guyana and Mauritius 
suggesting that as price went up consumption went up in those countries. The coefficient was not 
significant in Ivory Coast, Tanzania, Belize, Fiji, Madagascar, Malawi, Swaziland, and 
Zimbabwe implying a non- responsiveness of consumption to price in these countries. One 
explanation of consumers’ non-sensitivity to price might be that there is no readily available 
substitute for sugar in these countries.  
4.1.2.2.2 Ending Stock 
In the ending stock equation, the coefficient for lag ending stock is positive and statistically 
different from zero for Barbados, Belize, Ivory Coast, Fiji, Guyana, Jamaica, Madagascar, 
55 
 
Table 4.1.2.2 Coefficient estimates for consumption and ending stock 
Barbados 
LnPCCt =  - 16.02 + 0.47LnPCCt-1 + 1.91LnPCIt - 0.20LnPt - 0.02T 
       (-2.17)** (2.93)*** (2.43)**         (-1.80)*     (-2.36)** 
N=31    R2 = 0.51                                    Dh= 2.1792 
 
ESt = 15989 + 0.40ESt-1+ 0.56PRDt - 0.86CONt - 0.6EXPt  
       (3.88)*** (2.67)**      (7.35)*** (-3.70) ***     (-3.13)***   
N=31    R2 = 0.7651                                 Dh= 2.9964 
 
Belize 
LnPCCt =  1.44+ 0.55LnPCCt-1 + 0.06 LnPCIt + 0.05 LnPt + 0.41 DUM86 
 (0.73)  (3.37)*** (0.28)  (1.16)  (3.85)*** 
N=31  R2 = 0.5161                        Dt= 0.4526 
 
ESt = 7755 + 0.98ESt-1 - 0.83CONt + 1.03PRDt -1.06EXPt - 3.85PEUt 
        (1.77)*    (13.10) ***  (-2.06)*  (12.63)***   (-12.27)***   (-1.37) 
N=31  R2 = 0.9542                           Dh= 0.5872 
 
Ivory Coast 
LnPCCt = 0.73 + 0.76LnPCCt-1 + 0.01LnPCIt - 0.06LnPt 
               (0.46)     (4.99)***             (0.07)      (-1.24) 
N=31  R2 =0.7692                   Dh= - 2.1382 
 
LnES =  6.96 + 0.82LnESt-1 - 0.89LnCONt + 0.64 LnPRDt - 0.46 LnPWt 
 (2.59)**    (7.12)***   (-3.10)***       (3.80)***     (-2.69)** 
N= 31        R2 = 0.8867                      Dt= -1.8441 
 
Congo 
LnPCCt =  0.2 + 0.83LnPCCt-1 + 0.08LnPCIt - 0.1LnPt  
     (0.81)   (9.87) ***      (1.73)*       (-2.89) ***  
N= 31     R2 = 0.8326                  Dh= -1.6381 
 
ESt = - 30786+ 0.63ESt-1 - 0.38CONt + 1.51PRDt  - 125.78PWt 
           (-1.55)     (5.41)***  (-2.95) ***     (3.52) ***  (-1.74)* 
N=31    R2 = 0.8988                            Dh= - 0.1191 
Ln is the natural logarithm of a variable 
Dh is the Durbin’s h statistic 
Dt is the Durbin’s t statistic 
*** Significantly different from 0 at 99% level of significance 
** Significantly different from 0 at 95% level of significance 
* Significantly different from 0 at 90% level of significance 
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Table 4.1.2.2 continued 
Fiji 
PCCt = - 0.23 + 0.41LnPCCt-1 + 0.33LnPCIt + 0.005LnPt 
           (-0.16)   (1.93)*      (1.78)*       (0.15)  
N= 31     R2 = 0.3116                    Dt= 0.5629 
 
ESt = 18363 + 0.94ESt-1 - 0.30CONt + 0.8PRDt - 0.91EXPt -12.86PEUt 
     (1.02) (14.01)***   (-1.52)  (15.85)***  (-16.70)***   (-1.44) 
N= 31     R2 = 0.9617                      Dh= - 0.3122 
 
Guyana 
LnPCCt = 0.97+ 0.50LnPCCt-1 + 0.1LnPCIt + 0.05LnPt 
    (1.03)   (2.87) ***     (0.92) (3.06)*** 
N= 31    R2 = 0.7617                             Dt= 0.8076 
 
ESt = 31385 + 0.99ESt-1 - 0.85CONt + 0.89PRDt - 0.98EXPt - 4.96PEUt 
         (2.78)***   (32.71)***  (-2.90)***    (12.94)***  (-10.12)***   (-2.14)** 
N= 31    R2 = 0.9917                           Dh= -0.0453 
 
Jamaica 
LnPCCt = 0.12+ 0.86LnLPCCt-1 +  0.06LnPCIt - 0.05LnPt 
    (0.24)     (7.84) ***           (2.34)**         (-2.40)** 
N= 31    R2 = 0.7396 Dh=2.2020 
 
ESt = 41238 + 0.36ESt-1 - 0.44CONt +  0.30PRDt - 0.23EXPt - 25.06PEUt  
        (3.51)***   (3.47)***     (-3.76)***        (7.29)***  (-6.92)***  (-4.07)*** 
N= 31    R2 = 0.9401 Dh= -1.6609 
 
Madagascar 
PCCt =  3.40 + 0.51 LPCCt-1 +  0.00004PCIt +  0.0014Pt 
 (3.61)*** (3.90)***       (1.58)     (1.49) 
N= 31   R2 = 0.9052 Dh= -1.0570 
 
ESt =  3.72 +   0.93ESt-1 - 0.05CONt + 0.19PRDt - 0.44EXPt  - 0.02PEUt 
         (0.81)     (5.46) ***       (-0.12)     (  1.18)     (-3.45) ***      (- 0.11) 
N= 31   R2 =  0.9581 Dt= - 0.5208 
Ln is the natural logarithm of a variable 
Dh is the Durbin’s h statistic 
Dt is the Durbin’s t statistic 
*** Significantly different from 0 at 99% level of significance 
** Significantly different from 0 at 95% level of significance 
* Significantly different from 0 at 90% level of significance 
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Table 4.1.2.2 continued 
Malawi 
LnPCCt =  -1.36 + 1.05LnPCCt-1 +  0.11LnPCIt +  0.01LnPt  +  0.02T 
       (-2.75)** (13.37) *** (2.02)*     (0.31)      (2.11)** 
N= 31   R2 =   0.9764 Dh= -1.0320 
 
LnESt = 7.70 +   0.55LnESt-1 - 1.47LnCONt + 1.68LnPRDt  - 0.44LnEXPt - 0.33LnPWt 
             (1.32)       (3.70) ***     (-4.18) ***     (3.30) ***   (-2.69)**     (-2.35)** 
N= 31   R2 =   0.7765 Dh=  0.6540 
 
Mauritius  
LnPCCt =  1.08+ 0.63LnPCCt-1 +  0.02LnPCIt  +    0.02LnPt 
      (2.56)** (5.64)***        (0.98)   (1.94)* 
N=31   R2 =  0.9138 Dh= -1.3631 
 
LnESt = - 21.77+ 0.69LnESt-1   - 0.05LnCONt + 6.61LnPRDt  - 4.59LnEXPt  - 1.01LnPEUt 
              (-0.70)     (5.08) ***         (0.02)          (3.43) ***             (-1.82) *           (-2.02)* 
N= 31   R2 =     0.7685 Dh= - 0.4816 
 
Swaziland 
LnPCCt = - 6.37 + 0.84LnPCCt-1 + 0.94LnPCIt + 0.03LnPt 
     (-1.83)*    (8.69) ***        (1.93)*       (0.44) 
N=31   R2 =  0.9477 Dh=0.1766 
 
ESt =  3699 + 0.81ESt-1  - 0.85CONt +  0.88PRDt  - 0.88EXPt  - 154.43PEUt 
          (0.46)  (15.29) ***     (-21.83) ***   (31.56) ***  (-27.71)*** (-0.44) 
N= 31    R2 = 0.9936 Dh= 1.0383 
 
Tanzania 
PCCt = - 2.38+ 0.73PCCt-1 + 0.02PCIt - 0.00003Pt          
            (-1.13)      (5.21)*** (2.04)**        (-0.61) 
N= 31     R2 = 0.7227 Dh= - 0.0432 
 
LnESt =  28.45 + 1.34LnESt-1 - 2.97LnCONt +  1.26LnPRDt - 0.69LnEXPt - 0.64LnPEUt   
               (6.02)***   (15.13) ***     (-5.00) ***         (2.97) ***        (-5.68)***        (-3.33) ***   
             +  0.02T 
                (0.88) 
N= 31     R2 =  0.9823 Dh=-2.5576 
 
Ln is the natural logarithm of a variable 
Dh is the Durbin’s h statistic 
*** Significantly different from 0 at 99% level of significance 
** Significantly different from 0 at 95% level of significance 
* Significantly different from 0 at 90% level of significance 
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Table 4.1.2.2 continued 
Trinidad 
PCCt = 24.38 + 0.49PCCt-1 + 0.0007PCI - 0.75P          
          (2.94)***    (3.13) *** (0.92)         (-2.11) ** 
N= 31     R2 = 0.5693 Dh= 0.2746 
ESt = 8940 - 0.17 ESt-1 -0.06CONt + 0.23 PRDt   -0.26 EXPt  -26.86PEUt  
       (0.43)     (-0.91)     (-0.24)  (2.66)**         (-2.28)**     (-0.31)         
N= 31   R2 = 0.3546 Dh= 1.9685 
 
Zimbabwe 
PCCt = -3.69+  0.92PCCt-1   + 0.12PCIt  +  0.0005Pt 
          (-0.57)   (7.52)***    (1.31) (0.05) 
N= 31     R2 =   0.7939 Dh= 0.5768 
 
ESt = 92060  + 0.78ESt-1  - 0.31CON  +  0.19PRD -  0.39EXP  - 137.95PW 
          (5.77)***   (5.66)***     (-6.23) ***     (4.38)***     (-4.74)***     (-2.40)** 
N= 31     R2 =   0.8442 Dh= 1.5746 
Ln is the natural logarithm of a variable 
Dh is the Durbin’s h statistic 
*** Significantly different from 0 at 99% level of significance 
** Significantly different from 0 at 95% level of significance 
* Significantly different from 0 at 90% level of significance 
 
Malawi, Mauritius, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, but it is not significant for Trinidad 
and Tobago. As expected, the production coefficient is positive and significant in Barbados, 
Belize, Ivory Coast, Congo, Fiji, Guyana, Jamaica, Malawi, Mauritius, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Trinidad and Tobago, and Zimbabwe. Unfortunately, it is not significant for Madagascar. The 
consumption coefficient is negative and significant in Barbados, Belize, Ivory Coast, Congo, 
Guyana, Jamaica, Malawi, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. It has the expected sign 
(negative) but is not significant for Fiji, Madagascar, Mauritius, and Trinidad and Tobago. The 
export coefficient is negative as expected and significantly different from zero for Barbados, 
Belize, Fiji, Guyana, Jamaica, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Swaziland, Tanzania, Trinidad 
and Tobago, and Zimbabwe. The price coefficient is negative and significant for Belize, Ivory 
Coast, Congo, Guyana, Jamaica, Malawi, Mauritius, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. It is not 
significant for Fiji, Madagascar, Swaziland, and Trinidad and Tobago. 
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In this section, supply and demand responsiveness of the ACP countries to the sugar 
protocol have been examined. The results shed some light on how the sugar protocol has 
impacted these countries and three main conclusions can be drawn. First, the ACP sugar protocol 
supply is price sensitive. Second, the sugar protocol created a cycle of dependency reducing the 
incentives for the countries involved to improve their infrastructure and invest in the education of 
farmers on better practices. Third, consumption of sugar seems to have become price and income 
insensitive because consumers don’t have any choice. There is no substitute for sugar in these 
countries and they end up paying even higher internal prices than their European counterparts 
because of government policy implemented to protect producers. 
4.2. Derivation of Transfer Benefits 
In this section transfer benefits before and after the EU sugar policy reform are computed and the 
effect of the reform are examined. As explained earlier, the basic profit function framework is 
used where the transfer benefit is going to be derived as the difference between revenue and cost.  
4.2.1. Pre Reform 
 
Computed transfer benefits are interpreted as maximum welfare gains for participating countries 
instead of actual estimates of the gains. We assume that each country fulfilled its quota 
requirement meaning that they were able to export exactly the amounts that are allocated to 
them. This assumption is made in order to capture the full effect of the protocol but also for 
simplicity because data on the actual sugar protocol exports for all the countries were difficult to 
obtain. Results on the calculated transfer benefits are summarized in Table 4.2.1. The table 
reports on the protocol countries that are still supplying to the EU market. Therefore, out of the 
19 countries that are members of the sugar protocol, computations were made on 14 because five 
of 19 countries considered herein did not supply the EU sugar for that year. In fact, according to 
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the ACP sugar web site data, Kenya, Suriname, Uganda, and Zambia have not supplied sugar to 
the EU since 1986, 1980, 1978, and 1975, respectively. The other country, Saint Kitts and Nevis, 
decided to stop its sugar production after learning about the proposal for the reform. We consider 
2005 as a reference year because that is when the EU’s proposal was finalized and the reform 
started in 2006.  The first column displays the countries ranked from the highest cost producer to 
the lowest cost producer, column two presents the computed total cost of production, column 
three gives the EU price that was prevailing in 2005, column four is the 2005 break even which 
is the difference between price and total cost, column five presents the quota allocations, column 
six shows the transfer benefits which is the product of the break even and the quota, and the last 
column displays the share of each country’s transfer benefit to the total benefit. At 2005’s EU 
sugar price, the estimated income transfer of all beneficiary countries under the sugar protocol 
amounts to 296.3 million U.S. Dollars for that year. As can be seen from the table, all countries 
can profitably export at the pre-reform EU sugar price but the distribution is uneven. The highest 
income transfers go to countries with the largest delivery rights while countries with smaller 
quota rights receive a lower transfer. Accordingly, the largest share goes to Mauritius (42 per 
cent) followed by Guyana (17 per cent), Fiji (14 per cent) and Swaziland (12 per cent). All 
together, these four countries receive about 86 per cent of total transfer whereas the rest of the 
ACP countries experience fairly small transfers. In fact Barbados, Congo, Ivory Coast, 
Madagascar, Tanzania and Trinidad and Tobago each receive less than one per cent of the total 
transfer. 
The results also show that the most efficient countries are not the ones benefiting the 
most from the sugar protocol, due to the fact that the quota quantities were assigned arbitrarily. It 
can be summarized that all countries participating in the sugar protocol gain from the preferential 
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agreement because export earnings are raised and a significant amount of hidden aid is realized 
(Herrmann and Weiss). 
Table 4.2.1 Results of the pre-reform sugar protocol impact 
Country Total costs 
($/Ton) 
EUP 05 
($/Ton) 
Break even 
05 ($/Ton) 
Quota 05 
(Ton) 
Transfer benefits 
05  ($) 
Share 
Trinidad 673 680.13 7.13 43751 311,944.63 0% 
Madagascar 670 680.13 10.13 10760 108,998.8 0% 
Jamaica 633.69 680.13 46.44 118696 5,512,672.19 2% 
Barbados 596 680.13 84.13 50312 4,232,748.56 1% 
Congo 560 680.13 120.13 10186 1,223,644.18 0% 
Tanzania 531 680.13 149.13 10186 1,519,038.18 1% 
Ivory Cost 525 680.13 155.13 10186 1,580,154.18 1% 
Belize 497 680.13 183.13 40349 7,389,112.37 2% 
Mauritius 424 680.13 256.13 491031 125,767,770 42% 
Fiji 423.05 680.13 257.08 165348 42,507,087.51 14% 
Swaziland 370 680.13 310.13 117845 36,547,269.85 12% 
Guyana 366.63 680.13 313.50 159410 49,975,596.86 17% 
Malawi 344.20 680.13 335.93 20824 6,995,328.48 2% 
Zimbabwe 263.1 680.13 417.03 30225 12,604,731.75 4% 
Total     296,276,097.6 100% 
 
4.2.2. After Reform 
 
The impact of the EU sugar policy reform are reported in table 4.2.2. The table reports the 
information in the same manner as in table 4.2.1 except for the last column that was omitted. In 
addition the price considered here is the 2005 EU price reduced by thirty per cent to capture the 
full effect of the reform. Furthermore, we assume that costs structures stay the same for all 
countries. The estimates of the post reform transfers are reported in table 4.2.2.   
The results presented above show a considerable loss in export revenues for all countries. Under 
the sugar policy reform scenario, production costs in many countries (Trinidad and Tobago, 
Madagascar, Jamaica, Barbados, Congo, Tanzania, Ivory Coast and Belize) are too high and the 
new EU price cannot make exports to the European Union profitable. The Caribbean countries 
which were found to be medium to high costs producers are the most affected. 
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Table 4.2.2 Results of the post-reform sugar protocol impact 
 
However, there are some countries (Mauritius, Fiji, Swaziland, Guyana, Malawi and 
Zimbabwe) that are still efficient and can expand their production and export to the European 
Union. These countries can take over the quotas allocated to countries which cannot fill their 
quotas rights at the post reform price. If that is the case, the countries that cannot make profit will 
find themselves losing everything because they would have to stop producing. In light of the 
possible losses that are going to be experienced we develop a quota trade model with bilateral 
monopoly behavior as a method to compensate the ACP sugar protocol countries as a whole. Our 
aim is to allow the inefficient countries to have some revenue that they can use to invest in other 
sectors where comparative advantage can be found. 
4.3. Empirical Quota Market Analysis  
 
This analysis is an adaptation of a bilateral monopoly model developed by Devadoss that makes 
a reasonable representation of the sugar protocol. The model developed allows for a possible 
solution to the EU sugar policy reform. Moreover, it provides a way for the quota to be 
Country Total costs 
($/Ton) 
EUP 09 
($/Ton) 
Break even 09 
($/Ton) 
Quota 05 
(Ton) 
Transfer benefits 09 
($) 
Trinidad 673 435.32 -237.68 43751 0 
Madagascar 670 435.32 -234.68 10760 0 
Jamaica 633.69 435.32 -198.37 118696 0 
Barbados 596 435.32 -160.68 50312 0 
Congo 560 435.32 -124.68 10186 0 
Tanzania 531 435.32 -95.68 10186 0 
Ivory Cost 525 435.32 -89.68 10186 0 
Belize 497 435.32 -61.68 40349 0 
Mauritius 424 435.32 11.32 491031 5,558,470.92 
Fiji 423.05 435.32 12.27 165348 2,028,243.63 
Swaziland 370 435.32 65.32 117845 7,697,635.4 
Guyana 366.63 435.32 68.69 159410 10,950,434.76 
Malawi 344.20 435.32 91.12 20824 1,897,405.04 
Zimbabwe 263.1 435.32 172.22 30225 5,205,349.5 
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redistributed to the most efficient sugar producing countries. The model of trade of quota rights, 
described in the previous chapter, is applied here using the results presented in the previous 
section. We investigate the economic return of the model using different scenarios. Our emphasis 
is on deriving profits using the relative bargaining weighs, with the pricing and quantity decision 
rule being of second order importance. In what follows, we assume that quantity decisions are 
made by an outside party the European Union and for the sake of simplicity that the quota rights 
are equally divided among the potential buyers. 
4.3.1. Equal Bargaining Power Scenario 
 
We begin with the computation of the profit distribution by assuming that all the parties involved 
have equal bargaining power. When the buyer and seller have equal bargaining power, this 
implies that 1-  is equal to  so that each party’s profit would be equal to the total profit divided 
by two. The total profit is first derived and then equally divided among the countries. Equation 
3.1.18 is used to derive the profit in each bilateral trade case and the results are reported in table 
4.3.2.1 below. In Table 4.3.2.2, the first column displays the respective country. The second 
column presents the calculated profits from the bilateral trade model. The third column is the 
transfer benefits after the reform. The fourth column is the total which is the sum of the bilateral 
trade profit and the transfer benefit after the reform. 
The fifth column reports the transfer benefits before the reform and the sixth column 
shows the gains or losses which is the difference between the total transfer and the transfer that 
prevailed in 2005. The profit results show that there is a wide variation among potential sellers 
and potential buyers. Zimbabwe (which is a potential buyer) is the country that makes the most 
out of the model followed by Jamaica which is a potential seller. The comparison with the 2005 
transfer shows that even though most of the countries still experience losses as a result of the 
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sugar policy reform, there are income gains across all countries. One interesting result is that 
potential sellers are able to receive a compensation that otherwise would not be available. 
Perhaps the most interesting finding is that Madagascar and Trinidad and Tobago experience a 
gain as a result of the bilateral trade with equal bargaining power. 
Table 4.3.2.2 Results of the equal bargaining power model 
 
4.3.2. Unequal Bargaining Power Scenario 
 
We apply the unequal bargaining framework described in chapter three to create and analyze a 
market for ACP sugar protocol countries quota.  We consider an unequal bargaining framework 
because we assume that in each bilateral trade case one party is going to have a superior 
bargaining power over the other. We also assume quantity and price being determined 
independently. We begin by using equation 3.2.11 to determine the bargaining power and then 
3.2.12 and 3.2.13 are used to identify the profits in each case. Recalled 3.2.11 
Country Profit ($) 
 
Transfer 
benefits 09 ($)  
Total ($) 
 
Transfer 
benefits 05 ($) 
Gain or loss 
($) 
Zimbabwe 4,225,504 5,205,349.5 9,430,853 12,604,731.75 -3,173,878.4 
Jamaica 4,163,621 0 4,163,621 5,512,672.19 -1,349,050.9 
Malawi 2,235,583 1,897,405.04 4,132,988 6,995,328.48 -2,862,340.4 
Barbados 1,764,846 0 1,764,846 4,232,748.56 -2,467,903 
Guyana 1,685,430 10,950,434.76 12,635,865 49,975,596.86 -37,339,732 
Swaziland 1,602,659 7,697,635.4 9,300,294 36,547,269.85 -27,246,976 
Trinidad 1,534,699 0 1,534,699 311,944.63 1,222,754.05 
Belize 1,415,363 0 1,415,363 7,389,112.37 -5,973,749.1 
Madagascar 377,439.6 0 377,439.6 108,998.8 2,684,40.75 
Congo 357,304.8 0 357,304.8 1,223,644.18 -866,339.42 
Ivory Cost 357,304.8 0 357,304.8 1,580,154.18 -1222849.4 
Tanzania 357,304.8 0 357,304.8 1,519,038.18 -1,161,733.4 
Fiji 300,965.1 2,028,243.63 2,329,209 42,507,087.51 -40,177,879 
Mauritius 277,741.9 5,558,470.92 5,836,213 125,767,770 -119,931,557 
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β− = p*. From this equation we can derive β such that: 
         (4.3.3.1) 
In our analysis,   = q*,  = c1.q*,  = c2.q* with c1, c2 representing the unit cost 
for the seller and the buyer respectively.   
The world price plays a major role in the bargaining process that is being analyzed. We 
use world price as the determining factor in deriving the bargaining powers. The intuition behind 
using the world price is that if the world price is high enough, there would be an incentive in the 
part of the potential buyer not to participate in the quota trade and just produce and sell to the 
world market. However in the case where the world price would be low it would be profitable for 
the potential buyers to participate in the quota trade. Most market analysts expect world market 
price to rise if the European Union cuts back production and export subsidies, as total supply will 
decrease. Since the European Union is currently a major producer and exporter, the European 
Union reform is expected to have an impact on world market, though the precise effect would be 
difficult to quantify. Estimates of the impact of sugar policy reforms on world sugar prices vary 
within a range of one to sixty per cent (Milner, Morgan, Zgovu). It should be noted that Brazil, 
the world’s largest and most competitive producer of sugar, has been able to increase production 
levels (and exports) dramatically in recent years. In the period from 1995/96 to 2004/05, 
Brazilian exports almost quadrupled from 5.5 to 19.2 million tons. If Brazilian export supply 
continues to grow at a rapid pace, Brazil could expand into other markets as the European Union 
withdraws from exports markets. Thus, any price increase resulting from lower EU exports 
might be insignificant or non-existent (Busse and Jerosch). Therefore, two scenarios will be 
examined. The first is to examine the effect of a price (p*) set at the actual world price and the 
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second is varying the world price by taking into account the effect that the EU sugar policy 
reform might have on the world price for sensitivity purposes. An intermediate increase in value 
of 30% of the world sugar price will be considered for the sensitivity analysis. Using the above 
information combined with the cost and quota allocations provided in chapter II,  and (1-  
were first derived and used to compute the profits for each party.  
4.3.2.1. Unequal Bargaining Power with no World Price Effect  
The results are shown in tables 4.3.3.1 through 4.3.3.14. 
In this section we derive the bargaining power and profits under the condition that the EU sugar 
policy reform does not affect the world sugar price. Tables 4.3.3.1 through 4.3.3.8 present the 
sellers’ results. The tables report the seller’s bargaining power, total profit and the seller’s profit 
in each bilateral trade case. For example, the bargaining power of Barbados, when it is selling to 
Fiji, is 0.53, the total profit is 88164.70 U.S. dollars and Barbados’ share of total profit is 
47092.99 U.S. dollars. All sellers, with a few exceptions, (Belize, Ivory Coast, Tanzania), 
exercise superior bargaining power compared to that of buyers. This implies that sellers make 
more profit than buyers (Tables 4.3.3.9-4.3.3.14) in the case of unequal bargaining powers with 
no world market price effect. The overall impact of the scenario indicates that by implementing a 
quota trade market, it is possible to increase the income transfers of those countries that were still 
able to fill their quota allocation. Moreover, and perhaps a key result, those countries that are 
obliged to cease production because it is no longer profitable under the new pricing scheme to 
sell sugar to the European Union will receive income revenues that they can use to diversify their 
economies toward more profitable activities.   
4.3.2.2. Unequal Bargaining Power with World Price Effect 
For sensitivity purposes we carry out the same exercise under the scenario of a 30% increase in 
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world sugar price.  These results are reported in Tables 4.3.3.15 through 4.3.3.29 below.  
The results suggest that the price increase gives superior bargaining power to buyers. For the 
most part, buyers have a substantial (almost double) increase in their bargaining power.  The 
large changes in bargaining power may be explained by the fact that as the world price goes up, 
buyers have an alternative market opening to them. They can choose to expand their production 
of sugar and sell to the world market instead of buying quota rights from the sellers. Because 
sellers are also aware of this, they become less rigid during the bargaining process and lose some 
of their power. 
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Table 4.3.3.1 Barbados-Unequal no WP effect        Table 4.3.3.2 Belize - Unequal no WP effect 
     
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
   
Table 4.3.3.3 Congo - Unequal no WP effect    Table 4.3.3.4 Ivory Coast - Unequal no WP effect   
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Barbados    
Buyers β Total profit ($) Partial profit1($) 
Fiji 0.534 102,858.81 54,941.82 
Guyana 0.591 576,018.10 340,603.52 
Malawi 0.618 764,040.23 471,846.74 
Mauritius 0.533 94,921.97 50,620.29 
Swaziland 0.588 547,729.97 321,817.68 
Zimbabwe 0.736 1,444,122.11 1,062,526.01 
Total   2,457,180.65 
Belize    
Buyers β Total profit ($) Partial profit1($) 
Fiji 0.439 82,490.27 36,213.57 
Guyana 0.497 461,952.50 229,516.71 
Malawi 0.524 612,741.68 321,253.15 
Mauritius 0.438 76,125.11 33,354.11 
Swaziland 0.493 439,266.11 216,539.63 
Zimbabwe 0.655 1,158,150.80 758,835.18 
Total   1,595,712.35 
Congo    
Buyers β Total profit ($) Partial profit1($) 
Fiji 0.504 20,824.45 10,485.73 
Guyana 0.561 116,618.71 65,465.12 
Malawi 0.588 154,685.04 90,986.59 
Mauritius 0.503 19,217.59 9,659.93 
Swaziland 0.558 110,891.59 61,825.62 
Zimbabwe 0.711 292,372.15 207,943.27 
Total   446,366.27 
Ivory Coast    
Buyers β Total profit ($) Partial profit1($) 
Fiji 0.470 20,824.45 9,779.99 
Guyana 0.528 116,618.71 61,541.50 
Malawi 0.555 154,685.04 85,848.25 
Mauritius 0.469 19,217.59 9,008.71 
Swaziland 0.524 110,891.59 58,089.75 
Zimbabwe 0.683 292,372.15 199,566.91 
Total   423,835.10 
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Table 4.3.3.5 Jamaica - Unequal no WP effect      Table 4.3.3.6 Madagascar - Unequal no WP effect 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.3.3.7 Tanzania - Unequal no WP effect    Table 4.3.3.8 Trinidad - Unequal no WP effect 
Jamaica    
Buyers β Total profit ($) Partial profit1 ($) 
Fiji 0.563 242,664.37 136,556.31 
Guyana 0.619 1,358,941.10 841,151.36 
Malawi 0.645 1,802,522.64 1,161,857.79 
Mauritius 0.562 223,939.79 125,827.52 
Swaziland 0.615 1,292,203.79 795,092.08 
Zimbabwe 0.758 3,406,970.85 2,582,308.05 
Total   5,642,793.11 
Madagascar   
Buyers β Total profit ($) Partial profit1 ($) 
Fiji 0.587 21,997.95 12,903.11 
Guyana 0.642 123,190.39 79,039.31 
Malawi 0.666 163,401.83 108,899.98 
Mauritius 0.586 20,300.53 11,890.37 
Swaziland 0.638 117,140.53 74,738.40 
Zimbabwe 0.775 308,847.87 239,369.82 
Total   526,840.99 
Tanzania    
Buyers β Total profit ($) Partial profit1 ($) 
Fiji 0.476 20,824.45 9,907.74 
Guyana 0.534 116,618.71 62,256.31 
Malawi 0.561 154,685.04 86,787.18 
Mauritius 0.475 19,217.59 9,126.58 
Swaziland 0.530 110,891.59 58,770.06 
Zimbabwe 0.688 292,372.15 201,118.92 
Total   427,966.79 
Trinidad    
Buyers β Total profit ($) Partial profit1 ($) 
Fiji 0.588 89,445.38 52,632.97 
Guyana 0.643 500,901.73 322,271.23 
Malawi 0.668 664,404.60 443,938.35 
Mauritius 0.588 82,543.55 48,502.20 
Swaziland 0.640 476,302.55 304,743.34 
Zimbabwe 0.776 1,255,799.54 974,988.74 
Total   2,147,076.83 
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Table 4.3.3.9 Fiji -   Unequal no WP effect                                             Table 4.3.3.10 Guyana - Unequal no WP effect 
Fiji    
Sellers 1-β Total profit ($) Partial profit2 ($) 
Barbados 0.465852 102,858.8 47,917.00 
Belize 0.560996 82,490.27 46,276.70 
Congo 0.49647 20,824.45 10,338.73 
Ivory Cost 0.53036 20,824.45 11,044.46 
Jamaica 0.437263 242,664.4 106,108.06 
Madagascar 0.41344 21,997.95 9,094.84 
Tanzania 0.524226 20,824.45 10,916.72 
Trinidad 0.411563 89,445.38 36,812.41 
Total   278,508.91 
 
 
 
Table 4.3.3.11 Malawi - Unequal no WP effect       Table 4.3.3.12 Mauritius - Unequal no WP effect 
 
   
Guyana    
Sellers 1-β Total profit ($) Partial profit2 ($) 
Barbados 0.408693 576,018.1 235,414.58 
Belize 0.50316 461,952.5 232,435.79 
Congo 0.43864 116,618.7 51,153.58 
Ivory Cost 0.472284 116,618.7 55,077.21 
Jamaica 0.381024 1,358,941 517,789.74 
Madagascar 0.358397 123,190.4 44,151.07 
Tanzania 0.466155 116,618.7 54,362.39 
Trinidad 0.356618 500,901.7 178,630.50 
Total   1,369,014.87 
Malawi    
Sellers 1-β Total profit ($) Partial profit2 ($) 
Barbados 0.382432 764,040.2 292,193.49 
Belize 0.475712 612,741.7 291,488.53 
Congo 0.411794 154,685 63,698.45 
Ivory Cost 0.445013 154,685 68,836.80 
Jamaica 0.355427 1,802,523 640,664.85 
Madagascar 0.333545 163,401.8 54,501.85 
Tanzania 0.438943 154,685 67,897.86 
Trinidad 0.331825 664,404.6 220,466.25 
Total   1,699,748.08 
Mauritius    
Sellers 1-β Total profit ($) Partial profit2 ($) 
Barbados 0.466717 94,921.97 44,301.68 
Belize 0.561851 76,125.11 42,771.00 
Congo 0.497339 19,217.59 9,557.66 
Ivory Cost 0.531226 19,217.59 10,208.88 
Jamaica 0.438119 223,939.8 98,112.27 
Madagascar 0.414283 20,300.53 8,410.17 
Tanzania 0.525092 19,217.59 10,091.01 
Trinidad 0.412405 82,543.55 34,041.36 
Total   257,494.02 
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Table 4.3.3.13 Swaziland - Unequal no WP effect    Table 4.3.3.14 Zimbabwe - Unequal no WP effect 
Swaziland    
Sellers 1-β Total profit ($) Partial profit2 ($) 
Barbados 0.412452 547,730 225,912.29 
Belize 0.507042 439,266.1 222,726.48 
Congo 0.442468 110,891.6 49,065.96 
Ivory Cost 0.476157 110,891.6 52,801.84 
Jamaica 0.384701 1,292,204 497,111.71 
Madagascar 0.361977 117,140.5 42,402.13 
Tanzania 0.470022 110,891.6 52,121.52 
Trinidad 0.36019 476,302.6 171,559.21 
Total   1,313,701.15 
Zimbabwe    
Sellers 1-β Total profit ($) Partial profit2 ($) 
Barbados 0.264241 1,444,122 381,596.10 
Belize 0.344787 1,158,151 399,315.62 
Congo 0.288772 292,372.2 84,428.89 
Ivory Cost 0.317422 292,372.2 92,805.24 
Jamaica 0.242052 3,406,971 824,662.80 
Madagascar 0.224959 308,847.9 69,478.05 
Tanzania 0.312113 292,372.2 91,253.23 
Trinidad 0.223611 1,255,800 280,810.80 
Total   2,224,350.72 
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Table 4.3.3.15 Barbados - Unequal with WP effect                       Table 4.3.3.16 Belize - Unequal with WP effect 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.3.3.17 Congo - Unequal with WP effect                               Table 4.3.3.18 Ivory Coast - Unequal with WP effect 
 
 
 
Belize    
Buyers β Total profit ($) Partial profit1 ($) 
Fiji 0.263 82,490.27 21,704.32 
Guyana 0.298 461,952.50 137,559.03 
Malawi 0.314 612,741.68 192,540.54 
Mauritius 0.263 76,125.11 19,990.52 
Swaziland 0.295 439,266.11 129,781.32 
Zimbabwe 0.393 1,158,150.80 454,801.87 
Total   956,377.60 
Barbados    
Buyers β Total profit ($) Partial profit1 ($) 
Fiji 0.388 102,858.81 39,918.28 
Guyana 0.430 576,018.10 247,467.36 
Malawi 0.449 764,040.23 342,822.83 
Mauritius 0.387 94,921.97 36,778.45 
Swaziland 0.427 547,729.97 233,818.40 
Zimbabwe 0.535 1,444,122.11 771,984.10 
Total   1,672,789.42 
Congo    
Buyers β Total profit ($) Partial profit1 ($) 
Fiji 0.348 20,824.45 7,244.20 
Guyana 0.388 116,618.71 45,227.43 
Malawi 0.406 154,685.04 62,859.27 
Mauritius 0.347 19,217.59 6,673.69 
Swaziland 0.385 110,891.59 42,713.03 
Zimbabwe 0.491 292,372.15 143,660.30 
Total   308,377.91 
Ivory 
Coast 
   
Buyers β Total profit ($) Partial profit1 ($) 
Fiji 0.303 20,824.45 6,317.19 
Guyana 0.341 116,618.71 39,751.51 
Malawi 0.358 154,685.04 55,451.98 
Mauritius 0.303 19,217.59 5,819.00 
Swaziland 0.338 110,891.59 37,521.92 
Zimbabwe 0.441 292,372.15 128,906.30 
Total   273,767.91 
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Table 4.3.3.19 Jamaica - Unequal with WP effect                       Table 4.3.3.20 Madagascar - Unequal with WP effect 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.3.3.21 Tanzania - Unequal with WP effect                        Table 4.3.3.22 Trinidad - Unequal with WP effect 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jamaica    
Buyers β Total profit ($) Partial profit1 ($) 
Fiji 0.425 242,664.37 103,242.65 
Guyana 0.468 1,358,941.10 635,947.87 
Malawi 0.487 1,802,522.64 878,416.22 
Mauritius 0.425 223,939.79 95,131.21 
Swaziland 0.465 1,292,203.79 601,125.01 
Zimbabwe 0.573 3,406,970.85 1,952,339.86 
Total   4,266,202.82 
Madagascar    
Buyers β Total profit ($) Partial profit1 ($) 
Fiji 0.457 21,997.95 10,051.58 
Guyana 0.500 123,190.39 61,571.99 
Malawi 0.519 163,401.83 84,833.59 
Mauritius 0.456 20,300.53 9,262.65 
Swaziland 0.497 117,140.53 58,221.56 
Zimbabwe 0.604 308,847.87 186,470.20 
Total   410,411.59 
Tanzania    
Buyers β Total profit ($) Partial profit1 ($) 
Fiji 0.311 20,824.45 6,484.99 
Guyana 0.349 116,618.71 40,749.13 
Malawi 0.367 154,685.04 56,805.51 
Mauritius 0.311 19,217.59 5,973.69 
Swaziland 0.347 110,891.59 38,467.25 
Zimbabwe 0.450 292,372.15 131,640.00 
Total   280,120.57 
Trinidad    
Buyers β Total profit ($) Partial profit1 ($) 
Fiji 0.459 89,445.38 41,091.08 
Guyana 0.502 500,901.73 251,600.34 
Malawi 0.522 664,404.60 346,587.06 
Mauritius 0.459 82,543.55 37,866.14 
Swaziland 0.500 476,302.55 237,916.14 
Zimbabwe 0.606 1,255,799.54 761,183.34 
Total   1,676,244.08 
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Table 4.3.3.23 Fiji - Unequal with WP effect                                              Table 4.3.3.24 Guyana - Unequal with WP effect 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.3.3.25 Malawi  - Unequal with WP effect                                      Table 4.3.3.26 Mauritius - Unequal with WP effect 
 
                                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Guyana    
Sellers 1-β Total profit ($) Partial profit2 ($) 
Barbados 0.570 57,6018.1 328,550.74 
Belize 0.702 461,952.5 324,393.48 
Congo 0.612 116,618.7 71,391.28 
Ivory Cost 0.659 116,618.7 76,867.19 
Jamaica 0.532 1,358,941 722,993.23 
Madagascar 0.500 123,190.4 61,618.39 
Tanzania 0.651 116,618.7 75,869.58 
Trinidad 0.498 500,901.7 249,301.40 
Total   1,910,985.29 
Fiji    
Sellers 1-β Total profit ($) Partial profit2 ($) 
Barbados 0.612 102,858.8 62,940.53 
Belize 0.737 82,490.27 60,785.95 
Congo 0.652 20,824.45 13,580.25 
Ivory Cost 0.697 20,824.45 14,507.26 
Jamaica 0.575 242,664.4 139,421.72 
Madagascar 0.543 21,997.95 11,946.36 
Tanzania 0.689 20,824.45 14,339.46 
Trinidad 0.541 89,445.38 48,354.30 
Total   365,875.85 
Malawi    
Sellers 1-β Total profit ($) Partial profit2 ($) 
Barbados 0.551 764,040.2 421,217.40 
Belize 0.686 612,741.7 420,201.14 
Congo 0.594 154,685 91,825.77 
Ivory Cost 0.642 154,685 99,233.06 
Jamaica 0.513 1,802,523 924,106.42 
Madagascar 0.481 163,401.8 78,568.24 
Tanzania 0.633 154,685 97,879.53 
Trinidad 0.478 664,404.6 317,817.54 
Total   2,450,849.10 
Mauritius    
Sellers 1-β Total profit ($) Partial profit2 ($) 
Barbados 0.613 94,921.97 58,143.52 
Belize 0.737 76,125.11 56,134.59 
Congo 0.653 19,217.59 12,543.90 
Ivory Cost 0.697 19,217.59 13,398.59 
Jamaica 0.575 223,939.8 128,808.58 
Madagascar 0.544 20,300.53 11,037.88 
Tanzania 0.653 19,217.59 12,551.19 
Trinidad 0.541 82,543.55 44,677.41 
Total   337,295.66 
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Table 4.3.3.27 Swaziland - Unequal with WP effect                                   Table 4.3.3.28 Zimbabwe - Unequal with WP effect 
 
 
 
Swaziland    
Sellers 1-β Total profit ($)  Partial profit2 ($) 
Barbados 0.573 547,730 313,911.57 
Belize 0.705 439,266.1 309,484.79 
Congo 0.615 110,891.6 68,178.55 
Ivory Cost 0.662 110,891.6 73,369.66 
Jamaica 0.535 1,292,204 691,078.78 
Madagascar 0.503 117,140.5 58,918.97 
Tanzania 0.653 110,891.6 72,424.34 
Trinidad 0.500 476,302.6 171,559.21 
Total   1,758,925.88 
Zimbabwe    
Sellers 1-β Total profit ($) Partial profit2 ($) 
Barbados 0.465 1,444,122 672,138.01 
Belize 0.607 1,158,151 703,348.92 
Congo 0.509 292,372.2 148,711.86 
Ivory Cost 0.559 292,372.2 163,465.85 
Jamaica 0.427 3,406,971 1,454,631.00 
Madagascar 0.396 308,847.9 122,377.66 
Tanzania 0.550 292,372.2 160,732.16 
Trinidad 0.394 1,255,800 494,616.20 
Total   3,920,021.65 
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CHAPTER5. CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
5.1. Summary and Conclusion 
 
The pressures for reform within the World Trade Organization (WTO) have led to the 
European Union reforming its sugar policy with a price cut phased from 2006 to end in 
2009. The impact of this reform would be felt not only by EU sugar producers but also by 
the ACP sugar protocol countries that have a preferential market access to the European 
Union protected price embodied in the Lomé and Cotonou Agreements. The study 
investigates the effect of the EU sugar policy reform on these ACP sugar countries.  
This research makes two main contributions to the body of research literature. 
First, by examining the supply and demand of the ACP sugar protocol countries, 
innovations were made based upon the existing literature on the ACP-EU sugar market. 
The behavior of ACP sugar protocol countries’ supply and demand functions during the 
protocol years and prior to the reform were examined. While the determinants of supply 
in some countries performed as expected, others did not show sign of an improvement 
due to the sugar protocol. This suggests that there has been neglect or deterioration of the 
infrastructure in the sugar industry. On the demand side it was found that, in some 
countries, price does not affect the decision of the consumer due to the fact that there are 
no ready substitutes for sugar in those countries.  
Second, results of the quota market model under the simplifying assumptions of a 
bilateral monopoly model are in part a test of whether there could be a solution to the 
impact of the EU sugar policy reform on the ACP sugar protocol countries. This research 
explored how the protocol countries are affected by the former regime and how they 
would be affected when the full reform takes place. The results of the pre reform scenario 
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show that the countries were enjoying substantial transfer benefits and that the size of the 
transfer depends on the total cost, but mostly on the quota allocation. In the post-reform 
scenario, results revealed that there are some countries that will no longer be able to make 
profits if they were to continue producing and selling to the European Union.  
Finally, the study develops a quota market analysis using a bilateral monopoly 
methodology to examine negotiated transfer quota outcomes between ACP countries. We 
allow for the countries that can no longer make profits to sell their quota rights to the 
countries that can still make profit. Moreover different scenarios are examined, 
alternatively assuming equal bargaining power and unequal bargaining power. In the 
equal bargaining power case the total profit is equally divided between seller and buyer. 
In the unequal bargaining power, we consider two cases. The case where the world price 
is not affected by the EU sugar policy reform shows that sellers would have increased 
bargaining power and a higher share of profit. A case where the world price is increased 
by thirty per cent shows that the buyer will exercise superior bargaining power than the 
seller and obtain the larger share of the profit. The results show that buyers and sellers 
benefit from the quota market scenario and, most importantly, sellers that would have 
ended up with a complete loss obtain revenue that can be invested in other activities to 
enhance competitiveness. 
 
5.2. Limitations of the Study 
 
This research attempted to analyze the ACP sugar protocol countries supply and demand 
and create a quota market model as a response to the EU sugar policy reform. The 
research was challenged by data availability. On the supply and demand side the price 
data was difficult to obtain and proxies had to be used in several cases, which may have 
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affected the results in some cases. For example the data on producer price was not 
available for each country.  This led to the use of either the world or EU price, which was 
then converted into producer price using each country’s respective exchange rate. In 
addition, for the consumer price the closest proxy was the world price converted into 
domestic price, once again using the respective exchange rates. 
The second limitation was in the costs estimations. A complete data set on 
transportation and production costs for the ACP countries could not be constructed. 
Estimation was not possible because a time series data set of the variables that needed to 
be used was not available. Because of confidentiality, we were not able to obtain the full 
data from the recognized consulting company that has an up to date and reliable data. 
Computed proxies were used as alternatives in the cases where data were not available. 
Total cost was the sum of freight rates, fobbing costs and production costs. For 
production costs, USDA attaché reports were used.  For transportation costs, a data set 
was provided by LMC International. Of the seventeen countries, data on freight rates and 
fobbing costs were obtained for ten. LMC reports that all southern African countries ship 
from either the ports of Maputo or Beira in Mozambique and therefore have the same or 
similar freight rates. Following this rationale, freight rates are derived for the remaining 
seven countries based on the assumption that countries from the same region are shipping 
from the same port, and hence, all have the same rates. The fobbing rates for the 
remaining seven countries were derived using the available fobbing costs in association 
with the factors that explain differences in transport costs such as distance, country’s 
geographical and infrastructure measures, and common borders. 
Lastly because of the nature of the sugar protocol (form of aid to the ACP 
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countries), the application of the quota market model using the bilateral monopoly 
methodology called for the relaxation of some assumptions. It was challenging to justify 
the model theoretically and empirically but the use of the methodology was worth 
performing in this case. In the theoretical model, the buyer and seller decide the optimal 
price and quantity profile of the intermediate product by maximizing the product of each 
party’s profit, weighted by their bargaining powers. Our goal diverges from the 
framework in that we assume that quantity is predetermined by an external party. This is 
due to the nature of the sugar protocol and considering the fact that in previous cases 
where a country could not fulfill it quota requirement, the European Union was deciding 
the reallocation of that quota. Also, considering the nature of the sugar protocol, the price 
decision was clearly going to depend on the world price which led us to use the world 
price to solve for bargaining powers and profits. 
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